Nothing about Hollywood is more unrealistic than the droll one-liners delivered in the heat of battle. Nobody’s brain operates like that in real life — when facing imminent destruction, most of us just manage a few mumbled words followed by the sound of retching.

Yet history records some badass trash talk that would put Schwarzenegger to shame, some spoken in dire circumstances. Of course, it takes a certain type of badass. Like …

[...]

#7. John Paul Jones, the Battle of Flamborough Head

The Situation:

John Paul Jones, the father of the American Navy and the one-time temporary conqueror of England, found himself in dire straits on September 23, 1779, during the Battle of Flamborough Head. While dueling the HMS Serapis, Jones’ boat was outgunned, undermanned and, ultimately, sinking.

Having clearly won, Captain Pearson of the Serapis asked Jones if he was ready to surrender. Any sensible sailor would realize “certain death” was the only other option, but John Paul Jones was not a sensible sailor. According to the English, in fact, he was a flat-out pirate.

From a sinking ship whose decks were awash with blood, Jones shouted …

The Quote:

“I have not yet begun to fight!”

After this ballsy proclamation, which likely had the opponent in stitches, Jones began to fight. He rammed his ship into the Serapis, cleared its deck with sharpshooters and had his men storm its deck with swords and grenade-bombs like the pirates they totally weren’t, honestly.

The Aftermath:

Jones’ ship was lost, but Jones and his men had no problem commandeering the Serapis. He sailed it to the Dutch Republic, where Jones was hailed by the drug lords in Amsterdam as “The Terror of the English.”

Upon hearing that Captain Pearson, who had also survived the encounter, had been knighted for valor at Flamborough Head, Jones added to his list of awesome quotes with:

“Should I have the good fortune to fall in with him again, I’ll make a lord of him.”

6. Oliver Hazard Perry, Battle of Lake Erie

The Situation:

Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry was the type of man that Cracked lists were invented for, starting with his impossibly ballsy name.

When he engaged the Royal Navy in the Battle of Lake Erie during the War of 1812, the 27-year-old Perry famously boasted, “If a victory is to be gained, I will gain it.” He meant it.

Perry experienced slight setbacks, like his flagship getting sunk while he was on it, but the battle was nevertheless one of the most spectacular naval victories in U.S. history, so much so that it marked the first time a British naval squadron had surrendered, ever.

As the ships were now the property of the U.S. Navy, Perry sent a message to General William Henry Harrison to let him know about their recent acquisitions. The message described all Perry felt there was to describe about such a historical victory:

The Quote:

“We have met the enemy and they are ours.”

The Aftermath:

Perry became one of the most beloved heroes of the war, alongside the ranks of future presidents Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison. Had he not perished just a few years later, it could very well have been him sitting in the presidential chair instead of Harrison.

But hey, at least he got a stamp!

There are eight more non-naval instances of awesome historical trash talk on this list. Read the entire article (it’s hilarious).
Courtesy of Jacopo della Quercia and Cracked.com.
Image: The Battle of Lake Erie by Percy Moran.

This article is as long as it is fascinating (very), so I highly recommend downloading the PDF to read at your leisure. I will not be including the full text here.

Social Politics and the Midshipmen’s Mutiny, Portsmouth 1791
by S. A. Cavell

Social Politics and the Midshipmen’s Mutiny (PDF)

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Few events in Royal Navy history are more provocative than mutiny. The word evokes images of unrest that range from civilized protests to acts of carnage. In 1797 the Great Mutiny at Spithead took the form of a labour strike over low wages, inadequate care of the sick and wounded, and the injustice of awarding additional bounties to unskilled men brought in by the Quota Acts. In the same year, a mutiny aboard HMS Hermione (32) saw the crew murder their captain, Hugh Pigot, and most of the ship’s officers in revenge for Pigot’s ‘inconsistent and irrational brutality’. These examples address two aspects of mutiny – lower-deck resistance to quarterdeck authority and physical violence – which, to varying degrees, have come to define the phenomenon. Yet one mutiny, which took place in 1791, exhibited neither of these characteristics. In the wake of the Nootka Sound and Ochakov mobilizations, a large-scale act of insubordination struck a potentially serious blow to naval discipline within the Channel Fleet. The threat, however, came from a most unlikely source – the fleet’s ‘young gentlemen’, or commissioned officers-in-training.

The strange affair of the ‘Midshipmen’s Mutiny’ has received little attention from modern historians. Contemporaries, too, describe the events only in passing with short references appearing in various memoirs and a few extant newspaper articles. Yet, the events surrounding the Midshipmen’s Mutiny inspired four days of testimony at a court martial involving the most senior officers of the Channel Fleet. The threat posed to ‘good order and discipline’ appeared to be of utmost concern to Lord Hood, the commander-in-chief, and the captains and admirals who participated in the court martial of one of the ringleaders, Midshipman Edward Moore.4 The trial transcript revealed the seriousness with which the Admiralty approached the case which centred on the retaliatory actions of a number of young gentlemen who voiced their outrage over the treatment of a colleague. Their actions also spoke to a wider crisis of identity and authority within the navy’s corps of officer aspirants. This article examines the details of the mutiny, proposes explanations for its development, and looks at the possible reasons why so little information has come to light about this extraordinary event.

Read the rest…

Social Politics and the Midshipmen’s Mutiny (PDF)

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From The Mariner’s Mirror 98:1 (February 2012). Courtesy of Jose C. and S. A. Cavell.
Image: Court Martial of the Officers of the Megaera Aboard the HMS Wellington (1871). Courtesy of Old Print.

Mastering Leadership Reflexes: A Case Study of Captain Aubrey in Master and Commander, Utilizing Russell West’s Reflex Leadership Theory
by David M. Durst, Mark L. Russell, J. Michael Cuckler

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The assumption of the present writers and of all leadership theory is that the future is neither predetermined, nor fully determinable. People can influence, but not control their environment and their future. Those who would lead must learn to dance to or act in response to environmental stimuli and the movement of fellow dancers. Using a popular film and a contemporary leadership development paradigm, we seek to illustrate that though events provoke responses from us, it is possible to develop the inner being so that a leader acts reflexively and wisely in the real world.

Russell West’s reflex leadership theory sees four elements at work in every leader-needy situation (West, 2004). The first two, context and episode, are externals which provoke a response. The second set, the person’s reflexes and habitus are the internal processes by which a person feels, thinks and acts, making the situation either better or worse. Drawing on his experience as an entrepreneurial leader, teacher and United States Marine drill instructor, West argues that both habitus and reflexes can be intentionally formed, empowering a leader to respond with wisdom and strength to presenting exigencies. He writes, “When encountered with a leader-needy situation, most people reach deep within and sometimes beyond themselves for adequate solutionary resources and forces. Habitus is that place to which they reach” (2004, pp. 190-191). West identifies eight traits and eight techniques that can raise leader effectiveness.

In Master and Commander: The Far Side of the World (Weir, 2003), audiences behold an English frigate being tossed by storms and fired upon by a superior French warship. The year is 1805, the age of Napoleon’s rise. The English vessel, the HMS Surprise, is an aging 28-gun warship, led by Captain Jack Aubrey (played by Russell Crowe). His orders are to sink, burn or take as prize the superior French privateer, Acheron, which is en route to the Pacific “intent on carrying the war into those waters.” The roles of prey and predator sometimes reverse, as Aubrey demonstrates well-honed leadership reflexes and mentors people in his context, and ours.

Traits that Increase Leadership Effectiveness

Let’s first consider the eight traits or interior qualities West says are key to leadership.

The Core-Keeping Reflex

A leader’s strength begins with fidelity to values. Through the film, it becomes increasingly clear that Aubrey’s men may not always like the decisions their chief announces, but they respect the source from which they spring. These include the traditions of the sea, the intrinsic worth of people, fidelity to command and protecting the homeland. The doctor’s call to rid the ship of alcohol is rejected based on hundreds of years of “privilege and tradition.” Aubrey demonstrates respect for human souls through the death rituals, which announce with pride the names and roles of officers and conscripts alike.

Without a doubt, however, the ultimate value lived out by the sea captain is his devotion to England. Aubrey repeatedly shocks his crew with his persistence in pursuing the enemy ship, beyond orders, beyond expectations and beyond reason. Yet, he repeatedly reminds them that they are a warship at war and must act accordingly regardless of risks. “Duty” is not ultimately to the chain of command, but to the grand purpose, which has propelled the leader into service.

Leaders such as Captain Aubrey often push their subordinates to their limits. But, while the moment by moment decisions and actions of such leaders are not always predictable, those who act and react from a firm core of values are followed because their motivations are trusted.

The Ethical Consideration Reflex

Choices can be made on the basis of fear, peer-pressure, immediate gratification, pragmatics or principle.

Two episodes within Master and Commander vividly portray the importance of ethical reflexes. In one, a storm has cast a man and a platform into the icy Atlantic. While the man is calling for help and attempting to draw himself closer to the ship, the sea threatens to engulf the ship, now tilted by the drag of the fallen rigging. Ultimately, the captain orders the ropes to be cut. The friend is lost; the ship is saved. Later, the Surprise has its prize in view and the positional advantage, but the doctor who is the captain’s confidant, has been shot and needs surgery. Aubrey calls off the chase and turns to land where surgery is safely and successfully performed.

Ethical considerations often strain the soul. Leaders who are able to make right choices in ethically muddied situations demonstrate an inner being worthy of respect.

Style Versatility Reflex

Some people are predictable to a fault. Those who find within themselves a freedom and ability to adjust their personal style are able to lead more people in more contexts.

Aubrey demonstrates situational leadership. We see him in full authoritarian mode when his position is communicated, by the positioning of his hat, a firm countenance and his dismissal of all objections. He halts his friend’s complaint of a broken promise: “We have no time for your hobbies, Sir!” End of discussion. At other times, the captain is the cheerleader of comrades who are repairing the ship. He is a compassionate visitor of the injured and the counselor of emerging leaders. Whatever Aubrey’s preferred role, he stretches to meet people where they are.

Negotiating Reflex

Leaders can be sure that they will be called upon to facilitate agreement between conflicting parties. When faced with conflict within the group or between competing organizations, something from within will either push a leader to fight, flight or fix. Each has its appropriate moment, but a healthy leader often strives for the third alternative.

In one instance, a crew member fails to salute an officer and, in fact, makes insubordinate contact. Aubrey knew why the crewman did not salute the officer and may have agreed that the officer was not worthy of respect. Aubrey’s fix is to have the crewman flogged and to forcefully, but separately, correct the young officer as well.

Although the ability to see things clearly is a leadership strength, it is a great advantage to attempt to view each side of a dispute and to bring a new reality into being through negotiation.

Orchestrative Judgment Reflex

Every concert attendant knows there is a difference between the warm-up and the performance. The first displays individuality, as each instrument is a world unto itself. The chaos ceases, however, when the conductor enters the context and goes to work.

During one of the opening scenes, the HMS Surprise suffers considerable damage. The crew and officers try to persuade Capt. Aubrey to return to England or even to a nearby jungle, to make repairs. However, Aubrey finds a way to make repairs to the ship without falling too far behind the pursuit of the enemy. Repairs are made “on the fly.” By garnishing available resources and motivating his crew, the Surprise is soon back on the trail of the French vessel. The reflex of sequencing diverse resources for a single use is an important leadership strength.

Solutionary Reflex

The solutionary reflex is the leader’s ability to generate innovations to address problems. On two occasions, the HMS Surprise is a victim of surprise, and is threatened with destruction. In the first event, the rudder is destroyed by the Acheron’s cannons. Aubrey’s solution was to have the lifeboats tug the ship into the fog where they could do repairs unseen. In a second escape, the captain gained significant capital in the eyes of his men, by returning to their previous course, but this time in the advantageous position. A weathered officer boasts to the men around him, “All my years I’ve never seen anything like it … that’s seamanship!” Near the end of the film, Aubrey leads his crew to morph their warship into a whaling ship, at least outwardly, and suddenly the predator becomes the prey.

People at every level of organizational leadership can boost their status by identifying a pressing problem and solving it. Somewhere deep inside, the leader believes that a solution exists and sets out to find it.

Political Awareness Reflex

Another leader capacity is that of perceiving competing agendas. It is naïve to believe that no one in an organization carries any personal or competing agendas.

Although a 19th century ship’s captain was largely shielded by coercive power, we do see Aubrey consulting with the doctor and asking what the men are thinking and saying. Clearly, it would take a great deal of opposing pressure to convince him to end the pursuit, but he demonstrates wisdom in tending to the pulse of various interests.

A true leader is unimpressed with robotic obedience, preferring that subordinates generate ideas, develop their strengths and operate from their core values and passions. It is not the elimination of political agendas, but the coordinating of them, that advances a cause.

Action Biased Reflex

This trait involves responding proactively to situations with energy for changes. The other traits are of little value if not accompanied by a tendency to translate thought into action.

The opening scene of Master and Commander provides an instructive contrast of the degree of action bias among leaders. An officer on watch glimpses threatening shadows through the fog, but is hesitant to act. A peer comes alongside and the two converse as follows:

Callamy: What is it?

Bonden: Um… Two points off the starboard bow, in the fog bank.

Callamy: What was it? A sail?

Bonden: I don’t know what it was.

Callamy: Should we beat to quarters?

Bonden: I can’t be certain.

Callamy: You’re officer of the watch. Bonden, you must make a decision… (Bonden hesitates) We shall beat to quarters!

The resulting summons is both late and timid, contributing to disaster. Bonden’s reflexes are biased for information, not action. Only with certainty would he dare to initiate action.

Certainty is a luxury in the real world. The action bias is not a call to business. It rather reflects a tendency to move into appropriate action as soon as possible.

Reflex Techniques to Increase Leadership Effectiveness

West’s eight valued leadership reflex techniques are also well demonstrated in Master and Commander. While there is some overlap with the previous list, these are measurable skills that should be continually nurtured in growing leaders.

Continuous Learning Reflex

Leaders learn continually and intentionally.

Aubrey, despite being “master” of a warship, finds creative ways to learn. He creates space for feedback and vulnerability. The ship’s surgeon, Dr. Stephen Maturin, regularly visits Aubrey in his quarters and, at times, vociferously debates his leadership decisions. Aubrey is also seen reading The Victories of Lord Nelson, the memoirs of the famous British admiral.

Late in the story, Aubrey listens to a thirteen-year-old describe a unique animal that disguises itself as a stick to hide from predators. His genuine interest in learning from the young man creates an opportunity to apply a chameleon approach in battle. He develops a strategy to take the Acheron by camouflaging his warship as a whaling vessel.

Engaged leaders do not listen simply to please or appease followers, but to gain valuable insights and information that advance the organization’s mission.

Mentoring Reflex

Aubrey mentors as he was mentored. He frequently mentions his former commander, Lord Nelson, and once muses, “With Nelson, you felt your heart glow.” He deliberately encourages the ship officers not to only revere Nelson, but also to emulate him as a human being.

The Surprise’s captain takes advantage of difficult work situations to mentor others in overcoming challenges. Following the insubordination scene, he explains that an officer’s job is to lead, not to be a friend. He mentors people informally in critical learning situations, rather than in formal classroom settings.

Leaders who did not have a mentor will not be as prepared as they could be for calls on their leadership ability. Similarly, leaders who are not mentoring others are not complete leaders. While for many being a leader means having followers, true leaders produce other leaders, largely through mentoring.

Collaborative Reflex

This represents a leader’s skill of collaborating with others to develop group-oriented success rather than simply individual accomplishment. Collaboration is not present if success is dependent only on the leader and if the rewards go to the leader alone.

Aubrey develops camaraderie with his executive team, frequently dining and conversing with them. He participates in song and exchanging jokes. These good times enable him to develop a personal connection with his key leaders and produce leadership capital, increasing his credibility during the more desperate portions of their journey.

The scenes in which the ship must be repaired are excellent displays of collaboration. Aubrey personally visits injured men on the ship. He inspects damage. He empowers the crew to handle their own repairs, recognizing that they were more knowledgeable than him regarding these details. In sum, he creates an environment in which they all work together using their individual strengths and abilities to accomplish a common goal.

Contemporary leaders succeed by creating environments in which people are able to give the best they can at the time it is most needed. This is not a trick, it is genuine empowerment.

Sense-Making Reflex

Sense-making is the leadership task of framing messages in such a way that people are able to understand past episodes, present reality and future plans.

Following a junior officer’s suicide, Aubrey creates space for people to move on. He recognizes some may feel responsible for this death and communicates that the slate is clean and no residue from this tragedy will tarnish the mission. He shows grace and provides redemption. Without attempting to give unknowable answers, Aubrey deflects a potentially divisive incident and creates unity and forward mobility for the organization.

In the midst of confusion, people need clarity and they look to leaders to provide it.

Diagnostic Reflex

This technique is based on the leader’s ability to read situations and unlock explanations. In changing contexts, leaders must see reality clearly to diagnose both causes and solutions.

Twice in the movie, the “ghost ship” surprisingly assaults the HMS Surprise. After both encounters, Aubrey is seen in deep thought, analyzing the situation. His reflex is not to rebuke those on whom blame might fall, but to diagnose and correct the process. Following each battle, an evaluation process takes place. Officers evaluate what led to the fight, how the fight went and the appropriate next steps. It is worth noting that almost all teams have their problem-focused people. They are good at diagnosing the problem, but not at developing solutions. Aubrey demonstrates the ability to give space to such people, but then move everyone into a solution-oriented process.

The leader does not need to have all the insights; however, the leader needs to be skilled in influencing the group to use its collective skills and talents to develop a clear analysis.

Capacity Development Reflex

Capacity development is the leader’s ability to multiply resources from assets on hand. Limited resources and funds are ubiquitous problems. While there is a time for aggressive strategies to increase resources and funds, a leader is often required to make the most of what is already present.

In the post-battle rebuilding projects and in the eventual metamorphosis of the Surprise into a whaling vessel, Aubrey led his crew to do what they would have previously considered impossible. A perfect scenario would have offered opportunity to gather new masts and to involve the English fleet, but success was achieved by stretching and innovation, finally enabling the weaker HMS Surprise to take control of the larger, stronger Acheron.

Ideal situations of surplus resources are rare. Multiplication of resources, rather than the accumulation of them, is the mark of leaders with the skill of capacity development.

Execution Reflex

Execution is the ability to translate theoretical plans into measurable results consistently.

During the diagnosis processes following their battles with the Acheron, Aubrey and his team spent much time laying out theoretical scenarios, which could result in victory. The entire crew participated in timed tactical and cannon firing drills. They anticipated various battle scenarios and rehearsed the steps necessary to execute effectively in battle.

Breaking down complex challenges into comprehensible constructs is the task of the leader. Execution does not take place “between the ears.” It is a learned technique flowing from reflection into practice.

Intercultural Advocacy Reflex

Wise leaders are aware of the various people groups affected by their decisions and are able to interact with competing interests and integrate them synergistically.

Though Aubrey’s crew is ethnically homogeneous and all male, it contains various classes of officers and crew. This is demonstrated in distinct duties and quality of quarters, food and drink. Though ostensibly the “master and commander,” Aubrey maintains awareness of the state of his crew through informants and observation and he honors the humanity of each.

In today’s globalized society, this intercultural advocacy technique is increasingly important for leaders. Leaders need to understand unique perceptions and needs of the various groups of people with whom they work, not only to keep peace, but to incorporate the valuable contributions offered by diverse people.

Conclusion

In the final scene of Master and Commander, Captain Aubrey discerns that their victory may not have been complete. Although Aubrey has captured the Acheron and put its sailors in chains bound for England, he realizes that the Acheron’s captain had not been killed, but had cleverly disguised himself as a doctor. Given the ending of Master and Commander, a perfect sequel has been set up for the viewing public. Perhaps this is also a fitting picture to conclude our study on reflex leadership theory. Given the reality of constantly changing contexts and the barrage of new exigencies facing leaders, every action conceives and gives birth to an unpredictable sequel. Through considering these traits and techniques, leaders can begin to discover their own reflexes in leader-needy situations and hone them for the next episode that is soon to follow. The dance between contexts and needs, leaders and followers continues.

About the Authors

David Durst is an ordained minister in the Wesleyan Church and a doctoral candidate in Intercultural Studies, majoring in leadership, evangelism and church growth.

Mark Russell is director of spiritual integration for HOPE International and a doctoral candidate, researching the use of business in missions.

J. Michael Cuckler is an instructor in sociology and youth ministry at Asbury College, and a doctoral candidate, majoring in evangelism.

All three authors are completing their work at the E. Stanley Jones School of World Mission and Evangelism at Asbury Theological Seminary in Wilmore, Ky.

References

West, R. (2004). A reflex model of leadership development: A concept paper. Journal of Religious Leadership. 3(1&2), 173-220.

Weir, P. (Director).(2003). Master and Commander: The Far Side of the World [Motion Picture]. USA: Twentieth Century Fox.

Courtesy of David Durst, Mark L. Russell and J Michael Cuckler.

Ref No: 346M/F/160 – 1782 – ‘Noticias de Europa y America’, manuscript book in Spanish describing the siege of Gibraltar

Letter written in Cadiz by someone who witnessed what it is related, to a friend of his  in Havana dated 26th of October 1782

It will cause horror and wonder in the world, the news of the fire and destruction of the floating battery [vessels]: terror to consider the sacrifice of about 1480 brave soldiers; killed, wounded and made prisoners in this fatal enterprise and, disbelief that in a matter of two hours machinery classed by its author and, adopted by the ministers in Madrid and Versailles, as unsinkable and fireproof, would have been burnt.

Giving feelings of humanity and benevolence due vent, we should feel sorry for the unfortunate yet courageous victims otherwise worthy of a fortunate and glorious life, the highest rewards for having faced this with heroism comparable to the more celebrated deeds in history not only in the execution of the action but also facing the imminent danger of either perishing in the flames or drowning at sea.

It is only natural that numerous enquiries should be made about this misfortune to find out the cause of the unfortunate event considering that it had been deemed infallible and, that detailed information should be required regarding the project itself, its execution and of the consequences and subsequent disposition of the cabinet in Madrid, in the most critical and interesting moment for all Europe which believed that the seige of Gibraltar would signify the end of the war. Because of this, it seems to me that an accurate and impartial narration of the matter, with the reflections that could be drawn from it, will serve to dispel the shadows caused by either national concerns or the first impressions of fear or due to the confusion and the variety of opinions expressed, with the aim of aiding whoever saw this narration to be able to make a fair and right judgement in relation to the disaster.

The 12th of the month (August, 1782), the combined squadron entered the bay of Algeciras, it was made up of fifty ship and [drop anchor] stretching from the end of Europe till the bridge of Mayorga, forming a line opposite the mont of Gibraltar. (This position was taken by express order of the Court, having been requested by the duke of Crillon, and some say the count of Artois, with the intention to frighten with its impressive presence the resolve of the [garrison] making more difficult the hope of a prompt rescue). It must be said that this situation not only would not have had the desired effect of preventing the aid of the garrison but also, it would have put the combined squadron into the considerable disadvantage of preventing it from changing its position when firing at the enemy.

The morning of the 13th, the duke of Crillon eager to execute the persistent orders from the Court to launch an attack at sea with the ten floating vessels, seeing that the weather conditions were favorable with westerly wind and calm sea, sent one of his helpers to Senor Don Ventura Moreno, commanding officer of the force concerned with the attack, with the orders to get the vessels closer to their agreed position. Senor Moreno, who was responsible for finding the best anchorage for the vessels, and in many ways showing signs of fatigue as a result of the significance of the task, had not slept for the previous three nights, and who overtaken with tiredness, was in bed, replied to the orders of the duke with the aforementioned reasons, and seeing that at five in the morning there was no sign of weighing anchor, the duke with irritation sent the Prince Maserano, one of his first helpers, with new and precise orders to Senor Moreno to move the vessels forward, whom replied that the delay in its execution was due to the fact that the cables of the warships anchored next to the Mayorga Bridge became tangled with those from the vessels anchored in the same spot, and suggested that seeing that the wind and swell were increasing, it was likely that the operation would be delayed for another day. But afterwards, we learned that the delay, till later that day, was with the intention of dispelling the signs of confussion and lack of morale of the navy. In that way giving the multitude of people who were there congregated, the chance of seeing for themselves the testimony [proof] that he was going to give about his operations.

He was seen to have set sail at 8 am with fresh westerly wind and choppy sea, his [battery] and that commanded by the Prince of Nassau were the firsts to [touch bottom] at 350 toesas away from the wall of the old wharf and the side of the Bastion Real, the remaining ones followed suit situating themselves in parallel nonetheless with some disorder and delay due to the fact that some of them were either poorly managed or their commanders were less well-informed. At 10 am those commanded by Moreno, Nasau and Cayetano Sangara opened fire with intensity and admirable skill at a time when the others [se acoderaban].

To repay for all the batteries, Eliot fired a stream of red bullets, bombs and grenades and in particular for that bastion situated next to the new wharf, that precisely flanked our batteries, the red bullets penetrated and latched onto its parapets and caught light which for most part was put out as a result of the fearlessness and zeal of the crew however, because of the intense heat that the red bullet retains and multiplying because of the incessant attack, it spread so much that by 6 pm the three batteries already mentioned were burning like coal however without igniting flame. Likewise, the other seven caught a bright lively fire, in particular those commanded by Senor Gravina and Senor Munoz affected, like the first three aforementioned, by the relentless fire of the garrison and extinguishing it in several ways with real courage and heroism. The remaining five, either because of their size or because of their location were less exposed or better said, considered of lesser importance by the English, remained almost intact.

At 1 pm  Don Federico Gravina sent one of his helpers to the duque of Crillon letting him know that he had put the fire from the bullets out, over forty times, and asking him for reinforcements. At 5 o’clock, the Prince Nassau disembarked, leaving the duque in charge and, at seven the same afternoon, Senor Moreno was summoned by the Duque of Crillon. The army was deployed, and more than twenty thousand curious people who gathered anticipating a happy and safe spectacle on the contrary, witnessed with sorrow and distress a scene that could not end in anything but tragedy.

It was not possible to put out the fire on the main five batteries, due to the fact that the bombs were poorly proportioned, and because of the danger of water getting into them which, dampening the gunpowder and ammunition, prevented the use of the own [said] artillery. The enemies increased their fire everywhere with such lucidity and amazing aim that the granades and red bullets entered the [portas] of the cannons causing  excessive havoc among the crew. Because of the choppy sea and fresher air, the gunboats could not get close enough to divert the attention of the enemy and in that way help the ten batteries. The ground fire and advance also ceased, without a doubt because, having started with such an intensity, they used up the munitions.

One cannot understand why these fatal oversights were completely overlooked. The more basic precautions by the generals to guarantee the retreat in case of disaster striking were not observed. Such preventative measures aimed at sending small vessels and boats to come to the aid at the first sign of trouble were not put into place. Even so, the small number of those boats which were available were not sent by officers so that, their crew overcome by fear and concerned about their own safety rather than risking going through the bullets being shot everywhere in the aid of others, remained in their positions or ran away abandoning their ships. In that way, those who maintained that the ten batteries had been sent from the beginning to the more inhuman of sacrifices, were not far from the truth.

The duque of Crillon, commander in chief of both sea and land operations, seeing the impossibility of saving the batteries and fearing that even those that seemed undamaged were likely to end up in enemy hands, ordered the commanders, at 4 am of the 14th, to open fire to all [with tar shirts?], after the crew was made safe. But the delay in aiding the ships, and the relentless shrapnell fire from the enemy towards those retreating, caused such confussion that it truly caused more losses than the ones that could have been expected from the enemy artillery, being many those who wanting to swim to safety, ended up drowning and even more those who overcrowded the lifeboats provided and caused them to sink.

It was no luck that in the middle of this disaster the squadron had been archored in Algeciras Bay.  Senor Moreno had asked Srs. Cordoba and Guichen help at 9 pm., both gave all their lifeboats commanded by officers but because of the darkness and the distance to the anchorage, the prompt landing of the 7,000 men was impossible and the misfortune of many could not be avoided.

The batteries commanded by Moreno and Nassau were the first to be destroyed as a result of the concentration of  red bullets on them to

which the others followed suit. So that by 6 am, the sea was covered in burning wood. The only remains of machinery for which construction Spain had used up a mount of trees and for which the most beautiful bronze artillery had been used as weaponry. Eliot who was aware of this unfortunate outcome[mess] either for humanity or to raise his profile, in the strenuous defense of the garrison town, sent several armed lifeboats to the rescue of 355 prisoners.

Following this honest account, wanting without a doubt to rise to the origin of the project and to descend to the moment in which disaster stroke, one can make the following assertions. I agree with all those who believed Mr D’Arcon to have been one of the most capable engineers in France, that he may have so much insight, and that similarly, he may have been a very sensible man and that he may have inspired confidence. I also agree that his idea of attacking Gibraltar by sea with safer machines than the ones available, may have been the only way to accomplish this. Finally I will agree that his plans were backed by an apparently sound theory which could have persuaded and seduced the Minister, predisposing this to prefer him over any other who may have suggested such enterprise. All this seems only natural, but we have also seen prominent men to [build up] chimeras and to defend them with more fervor than the one used to uncover the most evident truths, and all those who are not versed in a science, or who only possess a veneer, is no wonder that he would adopt the ideas of those who he presumes as having a theoretical and practical knowledge on the subject but, the thing that surprises me most is that the Count of Floridablanca and that monsignor de Vergenes had not only accepted the project with the sole explanation given by its author, without having consulted it with the experts, but also, that they had prevented the Navy from giving its opinion on the matter and rejected the initial concerns it raised over the defects in the construction of such machinery. Consequently, the danger that the red or incendiary bullets posed was exposed and consequently this experience was rejected.

It was guaranteed that the floating batteries built on the blueprints provided by Mr D’Arcon would be fireproof as he had maintained in the detailed manual that accompanied their plans. Regarding its construction, how many mistakes have been made! Firstly, considering the quantities and weight that they had to carry and the use they were going to be given,  the vessels chosen were not only old but also small. The supervision of the project had been left in its entirety to Mr D’Arcon who knows nothing about construction, consequently it turned out to be so much different from the initial plan, that one can truly say they were bearly similar to the machines proposed. This variation may have seemed easier in paper but  in its execution, it turn out to be impractical. Mr D’Arcon should have asked for a formal experiment, but either due to an incomprehensible error of judgement or because of the sheer confidence inspired by the epithets fireproof and unsinkable, only its own artillery and the [velegear] were tested. What were the precautions taken against fire and immersion? To have piled a heap of logs over the hull of an old vessel, reinforcing its upper and lateral [resistance] and arranging inside some pumps and pipes to direct the water; these pumps, pipes and heaps of logs were badly conceived in the first place as it turned out, once the water inside the pipes overflew, it ended up making the ammunitions wet so much so that the batteries ceased to use the pumps which incidentally, neither the pumps nor the pipes were enough to put down the fire from a red bullet inlaid in the wood. Finally, even when the parapet and lining of the batteries had been fire proof, Mr D’Arcon was mistaken when he asserted that his machines would be fire proof and impregnable and that at the utmost, 100 men would be lost. The red bullets and grenades found their way in through the outlets for the cannons; the formers causing fires, the latters wreaking havoc. This should have been foreseen since in the 2 liners, the openings of the [portas] were bigger than the whole of the [chazas] and that out of one hundred bullets aimed at the flanks, approximately one third would have entered through the [portas].

The pronect was ill-conceived; unforgivably lightly undertaken, the construction of the machines was carelessly done; the execution of the attack could not have been planned and managed with more imprudence and inexperience, the main events cannot be thought of or even mentioned without a slight tinge of amazement; the least suitable day is chosen to carry out such enterprise. Fresh western wind and choppy sea which prevented the gunboats from accompanying and backing the batteries up, ceasing the fire from the boats at the most crucial time, giving way for the enemy to aim all its artillery to the batteries, and then the [crew] gets confused when it realises the strength and activity of the enemy fire, placing itself badly and randomly due to having overlooked some preventative measures; situating itself at last,and starting the fire.

Who would imagine that the duque of Crillon would not have thought of what every general thinks, before victory, in the retreat, if fortune did not favor him? Even when there were many who had warned him and even suggested the means. The navy did not propose them so that his worth would not be questioned. But those in charge should not disregard the sensible and well-intentioned warnings only to come across as bold.

That [Cortes] would be willing to burn his vessels leading his comrades to victory or death could be considered a heroic action depending on the circumstances, but to send seven thousand men on machinery which effective functioning had not been properly tested and send them on their own to endure the constant fire from a garrison town such as Gibraltar without having conceived the slightest retreat plan, is a decision that can be regarded as foolish. The astonishment  is even greater when one realises that not only the retreat and escape from the batteries was not properly planned but also that at a time of eminent danger, the means to diminish at least the damages caused by an excessive and blind confidence were not available. By 4 pm of the 13th, the duke of Crillon was aware that Mr D’Arcon’s  machines were combustible and sinkable, he knew that his men were mostly employed in putting down the fire caused by the red bullets, he knew that the fire was difficult to extinguish because it was concentrated and hidden and, it spread everywhere. He was aware that the few lifeboats available were not being deployed by officers and, he could not have failed to notice that any hope of launching a successful attack with such machinery were slim and to top it all, by 9 pm, it was not requested of the combined squadron the aid of the lifeboats so that the confusion already mentioned was inevitable and likewise, inevitable were the tragic consequences that it had.

To make the above behaviour even more absurd and incomprehensible, the following Sunday, the duke of Crillon maintained in front of several officers that he had never had the least confidence in the floating batteries, that he had opposed the plan and that he had not done more than to obey orders from the court. With this declaration, his responsibility regarding the lack of precautions taken increases and I do not know how this could be justified in front of the court, unless it is carried out with the intention to revive the spirit of the troops with its quiet confidence adding in the same meeting that he was confident of the success of the project from which he would pay otherwise with his own head.

I conclude my meditations over this ill-fated enterprise with the pronouncement of those more experienced in the attack and defense of garrison towns and who practically know that of Gibraltar, that had the batteries of Mr D’Arcon been fireproof and unsinkable, had the attack been well executed, that it had had the desired effect of pulling down the ramparts they were aiming at and that the assault had been finally carried out, that does not mean that Gibraltar had been captured or that it will be now in Spanish hands.

It is believed that the English have built endless entrenchments on the inside, mining all the passages and aiming their fire in such a way that anyone who had turned up would have been the victim of a false courage. As a result, they regard the failure of the batteries as a painful event and that it could have been diminished but that even when unfortunate it has avoided a greater disaster.

In spite of all that I have already related, I think that the king, with his stubborn nature, would not desist from the idea of continuing the siege for we have to await several attempts. It has been suggested that the plan conceived by the famous engineer La Valiere, the [vauban de] Louis XV would be revived. But it does not cross their minds that when La Valiere first proposed the plan of attack of Gibraltar there may have been half the fortifications and defences than the ones  recently discovered at the expense of so many treasures and lives lost. The idea then, to take Gibraltar presented as infallible by the French ministry at the outset of the war in order to engage Spain in it, has been the barrier against which so much effort has gone into and failed and will continue to be made even when well founded hopes it may have of retaining and increasing the gains obtained in other places, there is no doubt that Spain has badly invested almost all its power in the blockade and  siege of this garrison town at the expense of other more feasible enterprises having been generally agreed, and more politically sound, since the beginning of the war that Gibraltar in Jamaica should have been seiged [instead?].

The events regarding the combined squadron and the English one at that time became known and as a result the latter came escorting a big convoy with aid and reinforcements for the said garrison town (Gibraltar).

Admiral Howe arrived at the strait on the 12th (October 1782) when there was a heavy storm, commanding 34 warships and 60 freight. Our combined squadron consisting of 49 warships was anchored at the time in Algeciras Bay, awaiting the enemy whose proximity had been announced. The night of the 11th to the 12th, many of our ships, in close proximity to each other, were close to breaking down as a result of an increasing south westernly wind and the St Miguel commanded by Mr Juan Moreno weighed anchor and ended up in the Gibraltar bay and could not help ending up in enemy’s hand which added this ship to its fleet and is one of the fastest, the St Pablo, with 2 frigates was compelled to cut the cables and to set sail, entering the Mediterranean almost at the same time as Howe’s squadron and was lucky enough to reach Cartagena safely.

The warship lost its mast but the other 45 remained in good condition and it was believed that the following day, when the news that the English had successfully penetrated in the Gibraltar bay with ten freight, 2 frigates and 1 ship of 64, being forced to proceed towards the Mediterranean, they would depart soon, leaving 40 hours or more on preparations and  not setting sail till the day 14th with the aim of making the enterprise a more useful and glorious than the ones the ages had witnessed before, and as far as the elements and fate could have allowed if our superiors had taken advantage of the opportunity, but friend, there is no need to go as far as that, and once lost one should not regret or complain that this would have done much in our favour.

Instead of remaining static with our heavy squadron, near the strait, and certain that the English would have had to use this entrance again, and to give them their worth, we endeavored to, I do not know whether compelled by our fervour or because of our lack of knowledge, chase them.

They who run like the wind and are cunning like foxes, the first day sailed in such a way, so as to  make us think that we could overtake them, until we reached the open sea, when they revealed their trick [intention] of catching [us behind] at night and placing themselves in the position we should have occupied. It has been said that they [English] were like Barbarian who approached the coasts of Berberia risking getting lost in them in order to pursue the wind, but because of this impudence, they managed to make the most of the eastern wind that blew on the 18th to introduce all their convoy in Gibraltar, having gained a bit more territory than the one Howe had taken while [in sail] near Tetuan to later return to the ocean before the combined squadron could fire a single cannonshot.

By attempting to chase them, we made a mistake and, even when afterwards, we tried to put things right, the wind did not favour us. Once into the open ocean, we did not have to think of forcing the enemy to take a decisive action. However, our lighter division was able to reach them in time and in the end, 32 confronted the entire squadron commanded by Howe, 14  of those belonging to Bonet and Gaston’s divisions remaining leeward and left behind.

When the shooting began, those in command of the combined squadron were feeling brave and willing to continue but Howe, who had already achieved his main objective and in so doing, given the greatest satisfaction to his country, realising that the continuation of the fight could not achieve anything else but to contribute to the deterioration of a squadron otherwise necessary to carry out other projects, after a while ordered his men to leave and left us with the grief of knowing that we could not reach them, after the loss  in such brief and useless action of about 80 men and ending up with 300 injured. The present time now is 11pm, the combined squadron was entering and, considering the cannon shots they were firing, there must have been some run aground even when the sea and wind could not have been more favourable.

Friend, the account that I give is truthful and in line with the opinion of sensible people. You will very often hear others, it could be that Mazarredo could not justify the chase and that he had founded reasons for wanting to validate his maneuver, since he [Howe] is a man who is [believed to be] as the best English admiral. I admire him and even now some defend him but we cannot ignore the evidence that the English were the first to enter in the Mediterranean, that we were about to catch them in the mousetrap and that instead of entering in it with them , we could have waited for them at the door and because we did not do it that way, the mice have run away and will gnaw possibly where we do not have anybody to look after our larder.

It is a great misfortune that Spain has not succeeded on any of its endevours. It looks like the war will continue since the French will be sending troops to America and it is expected that our squadron, otherwise idle in Europe, will end up in that hemisphere. It is to expect that those winds would do them good and that our luck changes for the better, those neutral will refrain from mediating in favour of peace since they benefit from the war. Similarly the belligerent can allocate to themselves a [composicion] otherwise I trust all of them will end up without the prize [or energy].

Answer to the former, Havana 5th of May 1783

The navigation from that bay, undertaken on the 28th of April of the year after 1780 to this North America, was very successful. Despite being over the 100 sails the convoy that  was escorting the squadron commanded by Mr Joseph Solano consisting of 12 ship liners and other minor warships, we recognised straight away the islands Barlovento, Marigalante and Deseada the morning of the following 7th of June thankful for having avoided the superior British squadron that (aware of our arrival) was awaiting us on cape Salinas, windward of the Martinique Island which was the meeting point with the French squadron commanded by the Count of Guichen and consisted of 17 ships and some minor vessels, without making a landfall to the said cape [Salinas], the night of the 11th we recognised Mr Guichen. There were several attempts to take Royal Fort on Martinique and being unsuccessful, several vessels entered the port at Dominica, some on the bay of Grand-Once on the same island, just as they took Martinique and the remaining towards Guadalupe, where following a meeting of generals and chiefs, all the seriously injured were left with commisioners, rising their number of those to 1000 in a short period of time.

We continued jointed with the French till the island of Santo Domingo (disembarking on our way to Puerto Rico the Crown regiment, having lost in the getting off of corporal Rojo the merchant ship El Gallardo, registered at Veracruz) in which cove of the French cape (alias Guarico) Mr Guichen stayed with his squadron, following us to this port to which it arrived on the 13th of the following August, finding in it the ship ”El Dragon”and the frigate Rosalia del Rey together with 19 vessels belonging to the convoy that was split when we caught sight of the Barlorto Islands.

On the arrival of this squadron and disembarkment of the army Don Bernardo de Galvez planned the conquest of Pensacola and in order to do that he asked for the aid of Mr Navia ,commander in chief of the said army, to Mr Navarro governor and field marshall of this garrison town and island, and to Mr Bonet commander in chief of the navy for this Northern part of America whom considering the order given by S. M. to give Mr Galvez all the aid he needed, they were all cleared and because the preparation of the necessary vessels was delayed, once the time for departure arrived, it was already the wintering period which brought a severe storm that separated all the ships on which Mr Galvez and his army were carried, and caused even the ships of 80 to lose their spars, each of them ending up everywhere and nowhere resulting in the loss of a warship and ending up on the cost of San Bernardo (which is inhabited by fierce Indians who slaughtered everyone of them) a merchant brigantine which carried a chaplain and army troops. When Mr Galvez returned to this [island], his army which came back to get ready for the project, successively verified everything. He established his second departure for the 1st of February, 1781 taking with him [the main line to batter?]and campaign which came from Spain with the army commanded by Mr Navia, at the same time supplying him with the best post he had.

This expedition gladly arrived to the island of Sta Rosa opposite the port of Pensacola which entrance could not make the ship of 64, San Ramon, even when it reached as far as 19 feet having tried it twice through the canal that the waters made up in that harbour however, it always touched the bottom, for that reason the army was introduced in minor vessels without any other strong ship than the frigate Matilde.

The brigantine el Galvez (alias Galveztown) being one of the first to try out the entrance, in which its commander and army chief who after having being seen disembarking by the commander of the San Ramon, left with his ship for this harbour. Meanwhile Mr Galvez operated in Pensacola, Mr Navia who was told by the Court that Spanish and French land and sea forces would arrive at [Guarico], was getting ready to meet with them and verify the position of the island of Jamaica, as fast as possible, bloquing it with the combined squadron at that time far superior than the British one. In this interval, the night of the 7th of April they were warned from the cape of San Antonio that warlike vessels had been discovered and fearing that they  would be aimed at reinforcing the Pensacola and cut off  Mr Galvez, the meeting held by our generals (with the assistance of Don Francisco Saavedra who had it by order of the King) determined to send all the Spanish vessels to the aid of Mr Galvez and in so doing transferring 1500 army men, at the command of Mr Cagigal so that with this reinforcement it could accelerate the conquest. Indeed the squadron commanded by Mr Solano left (with whom Mr Monteuill, commander in chief of the French squadron also left with 4 ships, 2 frigates and 3 sloops from his nation which were accidentally in this port) the 9th of said April, gladly arriving to its destination where the rendition of Pensacola on the 8th of the following May was

verified. In light of such success, the said squadron and reinforcement returned, entering in this harbour on the 29th of the same month, to which arrival they found on this, documents by Court which ordered Mr Navia to give up the command of his army to Mr Galvez and on his absence to Mr Cagigal, to whom the command and general captaincy of this garrison and island was given, separating Mr Navarro from him, and it conferred the command of the navy to Mr Solano taking this away from Mr Bonet and that these three deposed generals should leave for Europe immediately (as this was verified by the end of the following June on the ships commanded by Mr Morales that were escorting a convoy for Europe) That Mr Wahen field marshal and [directly] subordinate to Mr Navia, should go to Mexico and await for orders from the King over there (who did not have any other option than to return to Europe once a peace deal was agreed) sending Mr Arredondo major general of the army, as governor of the city of Santiago de Cuba.

Having undergone such metamorphosis, Mr Galvez arrived, applauded, to this garrison and took charge of the army, and from that moment on the conquest of Jamaica was considered and in order to do that, he said that he was going to Guarico to receive the reinforcement of 4000 men who had departed from Europe in 4 warships commanded by Don Francisco de Borja.

The departure of Mr Galvez took place the following December on the San Juan [ship] only following him after some days Mr Solano and  his squadron, escorting the vessels that were carrying the army. Many of which were dispersed and one after another were arriving to this port, or [sandbanks] and harbours of the coast of this island. They left together by February 1782 accompanied by the ship El Velasco (on which Mr Galvez’s wife was carried) arriving without delay to the [guarico] where Mr Borja’s vessels  were awaiting with the already mentioned troops. At that time the count of  Grasse who was in charge of 32 French vessels found himself in Martinique in order to meet with Mr Solano precisely at the agreed time. Mr Cagigal who was convinced that with such combined naval forces, far superior to the enemy’s, together with those windward, he had an  unbeatable [antemural] of the island at his command, he decided to go himself to lead the small amount of veteran soldiers that were left in this garrison (because Mr Galvez had taken the rest of them) reduced to one Spanish battalion and another from Guadalajara that in order to take them to their full potential, he made use of 6 companies from the New Spain Crown regiment, that arrived to this after their flags were left. With this short number of veteran troops and a squad of militias, one made up of black and another of mixed race men, this governor set sail on 22 of April of the same 1782 in a war frigate from the united provinces of North [America] in charge of 5 other brigantines from his home country, armed, escorting 42 sails on which this army, intended for the conquest of the Lacayas Islands and Providence (because of its location very damaging to it as it has been the experience during this war) was carried. Which surrender was agreed to, without any hostility on the 8th of the following May. Mr Cagigal who had been notified of the defeat suffered by Mr Grasse’s squadron at the hands of the British admiral Rodney, returned immediately to this [island], leaving 300 men from the squadron in the conquered garrison town and with the order to his direct subordinate rear admiral Don Joseph Manriquez, to go back immediately to this garrison town with the rest of the army as he promptly did (in spite of coming with neither the frigate nor the American brigantines) [rather] than with brigantine that the Florida corsairs had captured. The disaster affecting the French was known by Mr Galvez in the [guarico], and fearing some [resultas] in Puerto Rico and this garrison town, he sent to this 500 men, commanded by colonel Don Pedro Mendinueta, transported in the San Juan and to this Soria’s regiment (with the exception of his grenadiers) on the orders of his colonel, rear admiral  Don Manuel de Pineda accidentally  in charge of the troops belonging to the army in operation. In July 1782, Mr Solano left the [guarico] with his squadron to which was included the French one commanded by the chief of this squadron Vaudreull who made his way to the port of Boston, also entering Mr Solano’s the same July.

In mid August [N. S] to this port 3 miles away, a British squadron turn up made up of 25 liners and other minor vessels commanded by admiral Pigot, who blocked it for 13 days, [finding himself defeated?] landing briefly in Rio [de Janeiro?], 10 leagues windward from this, looting some sugar and burning the one left in the warehouse.

In October the major general of the operation ordered his rear admiral to go and join the army with as many troops belonging to him as he could, which did not realise until the 6th of March of the following year in the 9 ships which made their way to the [guarico] commanded by Mr Borja. A few days after the departure of this squadron news broke that from Paris the [guarico] had been ordered to prepare for peace which prompted them to stop war preparations and hostilities. Then those appointed by our court arrived and as a result, all the army remaining in the [guarico] was ordered to leave. Entering this [guarico] the last days of the following April field marshal Mr Geronimo Giron to whom the command had been handed over . [his second in chief?] arriving a few days after his generalissimo whom soon after his arrival received the title of Count of Galvez and commander of Bolanos, news which arrived the day before yesterday.

The account that I am giving you of events taking place in the last 3 years that we haven’t seen each other is, as the scribes say, [before in the presence of ] me and mostly in the presence of my faithful friends and confidants from which you will draw your own conclusions, as you have already done with yours as you have told me, I will content myself with saying that having met on the 11th of June 1780 in such an advantageous and well proportioned place as the French Barlovento Islands, the formidable forces till then in this hemisphere made up of 29 liners with enough minor vessels to be sent for assignments and 14.000 veterans formerly commanded by Mr Navia with another 4 or 5.000 belonging to the French among their islands and squadron. Despite our hemispheres [distance], a big army would have been formed, with more than 16.000 men and if with these, and the 29 vessels we would have gone to Jamaica straight away, without any other garrison in Kingstown and Spanish town (the only fortified garrison towns) than 3 veteran battalions and some white and mixed race militia, nor without more maritime forces than the fugitive ones remaining in St Lucia, it is plausible (at least more so than the [vonds] at Gibraltar) that the conquest of the said island of Jamaica would have been achieved, that according to what you said in the last paragraph of the tragic narration regarding the batteries, was the incentive for the siege of Gibraltar, and in order to make a prompt and advantageous peace agreement, so that it would have enabled us to at least avoid the loss of between 6 and 8.000 men that with the change in the weather (and other reasons that are better kept secret) they have died and would have saved more than 100 millions of pesos, that with the failed blockade and siege and these unsuccessful enterprises, have been spent, without even mentioning the sad loss of that brilliant artillery, mounts of wood and as you explained to me, have been badly used in the attack with the D’Arconicas.

The thing is that the failure to have started the siege of Jamaica from Barlovento and planning from this, was an inexcusable mistake or the omission from the generals if they were capable to discuss it, or of unforgivable ignorance from the ministry if, once deciding to send the mission here and before operating, since there is no Catalan skipper [de Saetia] foolish enough that was not aware of the fact that from the said Barlovento islands to Jamaica it will take eight days and that from these at least 30 would be needed without been able to use as an excuse the relief of the people and the supply of provisions necessary before such enterprise since he is aware of (the limitless amount of coastguard vessels that operate on the coasts of Guaira and inland Caracas) the amount of smuggled goods supplied to those from that coast, coming from the surrounding areas of these islands; whereas well in advance, the necessary things needed by both the army and the squadron could have been easily provided for, the only reason why they came to this, whereas it is true that they got them, but only by causing a substantial deterioration of the island that had not been seen in years, which rather than doing it on its soil, the sale of its abundant cattle would have been preferable and at the same time it would have encouraged a new comercial vein.

We cannot speculate that the decision to remove Mr Navia from the leadership of the army could have been possible if [because of Jamaica] since its omission (if indeed was) had nothing to do with Mr Bonet and anyway, if anything, with Mr Solano; as we can see the latter took over the leadership from Mr Navia, so it is only natural that we should believe that the dismissal of Mr Navia and the positioning of Mr Galvez instead was done purely to justify the massive promotion given to him, whom having been captain of Seville in 75′s by the year 81 found himself as the lieutenant general (even when violently and at the expense of Mr Navia’s well deserved reputation and other reputable oficials). It is not my intention to work out whether those promotions had been given taking into account specific aptitud, zeal, courage or military experience, since you know him better than me, and I acknowledge that even when still young, God has endowed him with limitless abilities and even if he did not have a good education or enough experience, nature has favoured him by having been born nephew to the minister of these Indias, [to whom] has extended so much the limits of his ministry with his hasty conquests, which you will find out later if you check the [relationship?] our gazzettes have against topographical description in the atlas.  I am convinced that the ministry believes, or at least claims to believe that with such conquests it has achieved, if no more, as much as Gibraltar, even when one cannot deny that with this one would have achieved not only a tangible and useful advantage but also the worthy satisfaction of fulfilling the desire and yearnings of our monarch to which end I believed all the efforts from his ministers were aimed at, but as I have realised, I was mistaken.

You are brighter and more able than me to draw these political conclussions, so that, I have only touched the surface regarding the management afforded by the major general, I have just added more reflections, making sure that you will indulge me in sending me yours on what I have just told you.

Less shocking was the mission given to Mr Solano, than that of Mr Galvez, which for the same reason his inaction was noticed the most and arose more criticism, who not only did not plan a escape route, but also shamefully, calmly endured the sight of the English crossing in  front of this port and sailing several convoys with weak escorts, without even leaving it, parading up and down on our coasts, capturing several vessels, neither been intercepted nor chased away from our warships, causing this watchful and courageous governor on several occasions to arm American vessels manning them with troops from his own garrison to facilitate the arrival of the special delivery  mail boats relentlessly coming from Europe, and if this useful decision would not have been taken, many would have ended up into the enemy’s hands in our very doorsteps.

The squadron is laden with treasures and rich objects to be reinstated to that hemisphere, which I believe will be very soon, since a peace agreement is already in place, there will be a lot of activity and urge to set sail, as they say, in such a haste, that to avoid waiting the 15 days required by the major general to finish, and in order to rush them and  transfer them to those domains, I believe they will leave without them, exposing it to great dangers considering the bad state in which all the transports are, which are likely to be used for such means and in that way, increasing the sum to be payed to transport them.

Translation by Paula Reyes. Courtesy of Ren Jackaman and the Devon Record Office.
Image: Map of the Siege of Gibralter, 1705 (Gibralter has been besieged so many times it’s crazy!)

The French and Spanish not only wished to retrieve lost territory from Britain but needed to secure Gibraltar, which was a key link in Britain’s control of the sea. The fortress was besieged for nearly four years by the full naval and military strengths of the enemy. When the Rock was first besieged, the garrison consisted of 5,382 troops; General Elliot was the Governor-General, and his determined handling of the defence inspired all the troops under him with the greatest confidence. All the defences were strengthened, and many of the infantry, including picked men from the 39th Regiment, assisted the artillery in serving the guns.

The combined Spanish and French fleets blockaded the Rock from the sea, while on the land side an enormous army was engaged in constructing forts, redoubts, entrenchments, and batteries from which to attack. General Elliot formed a corps of sharpshooters, the command of which was given to Lieutenant Burleigh, of the 39th Regiment, which rendered splendid service in keeping the enemy constantly engaged, and inflicting heavy losses.

As the winter of 1779 came down the garrison began to suffer from want of fresh provisions, which became very scarce and dear. Bread was almost impossible to get, and was not permitted to be issued except to the sick and children. Salt meat and biscuits, and not much of that, soon became the food of the troops, with an occasional issue of four ounces of rice as a full day’s ration. Fuel was exhausted, and fires were only made with difficulty, the salt-encrusted timbers of old ships broken up in the harbour for the purpose. To the rigours of the siege was added a violent outbreak of scurvy among the devoted troops, due to the want of fresh vegetables and medicines. As the winter wore on, the scanty store of food grew so alarmingly low that the already meagre ration was reduced to just enough to keep life in the bodies of the men. But their morale remained high and the troops continued to take their turns at trench or battery, and endured the inclement weather and the shortage of food with fortitude.

Admiral Rodney, after defeating two enemy fleets at sea, reached Gibraltar in the following spring, bringing welcome reinforcements of 1,052 men and an abundance of stores. This greatly heartened the garrison, who, as soon as Rodney’s fleet left, found the fortress as closely besieged as ever. The defence was stubbornly maintained against every attempt to capture it by assault, and by the end of the summer provisions again began to run out and scurvy to reappear. While shot and shell were unceasingly exchanged between the opposing forces, scurvy and starvation rations made steady inroads into the effective strength of the garrison, but there was no thought of surrender. Throughout the second winter the gallant garrison faced foes, elements, disease, and starvation, until in the April of 1781 another British fleet succeeded in reaching the harbour with stores and food.

The French and Spanish, finding it was impossible to starve the gallant garrison out, they resolved to make further desperate attacks by land and sea, and a large army and fleet was assembled to carry this out. The adjacent hills over the Spanish border became thronged with great crowds of spectators, among them the highest families in the land, assembled to see the fortress beaten to powder and ‘the British flag trailed in the dust’. But the night before the grand attack was to have been launched, half the British garrison filed silently out of their defence works and made surprise sortie.

The whole body of the enemy infantry in the trenches were routed, their batteries set on fire, and cannon blown up and spiked, their entrenchments destroyed, and a very large number of the enemy killed or taken prisoners. Damage to the extent of two million pounds was done to the enemy’s stores and equipment in that night’s work, in which the 39th took a leading part. The loss to the British was less than one hundred. This reverse postponed the grand assault on the Rock for some time, but the siege was closely maintained. Eventually, the enemy launched their great attack; 200 heavy guns opened fire from floating batteries in the Bay and a further 400 guns on the land side, directed on the fortifications after weeks of preparatory artillery fire. But the garrison, replied with red-hot shot to set fire to and sink the enemy’s floating batteries and warships in the Bay, and beating off many attempts to storm the fortress from the land side. In that great conflict, the British destroyed nearly all the enemy fleet, with over 5,000 men on board.

The siege was continued for some months longer, but in the spring of 1783 the enemy retired disheartened and defeated, leaving the British garrison victorious, after three years and seven months’ conflict. The garrison sustained a loss of 1,231 men, and expended 8,000 barrels of gunpowder. The 39th, in common with the other regiments engaged in the defence, was given the badge of the Castle of Gibraltar with the motto ‘Montis Insignia Calpe’, in commemoration of the gallant part it took in the ‘Great Siege’.

Courtesy of Wikipedia and The Keep Military Museum.
Image: The Siege of Gibralter (1782) by George Carter. Courtesy of Gibralter Social History.

I’m also very excited to be giving away an eBook copy to one lucky visitor! To win, you must Like us on Facebook and respond to the contest post. Contest ends 04.27.12!

Patrick O’Brian: A Life Revealed by Dean King (excerpt)

Full Disclosure: I am posting this at the request of those in charge of marketing Dean King’s new eBooks. I’m not being paid or anything, I just saw an opportunity to give you some information you might be interested in and help promote Dean King, an author I really admire

Text and image courtesy of CP.

Not A Moment To Be Lost: Patrick O’Brian’s Aubrey/Maturin Series
By Jo Walton

On my way to MilPhil, the 2001 Worldcon in Philadelphia, I was re-reading The Fortune of War, Book 5 of Patrick O’Brian’s twenty volume Aubrey-Maturin series. On the bus in Newark taking me to the connecting plane, I saw a stranger reading Book 18, The Commodore. “Are you going to Worldcon?” I asked. She was. I therefore contend that the Aubrey-Maturin books, while ostensibly historical novels about the friendship between a naval captain and a ship’s surgeon during the Napoleonic Wars, are in fact SF. If that’s going too far, then at any rate they have the fannish nature, they are naturally appealing to people who like to read SF and for much the same reasons.

I do not normally read Napoleonic sea stories, they are not my thing. I started reading these when they were recommended to me by Pamela Dean, and you wouldn’t think they’d be her thing either. She recommended reading them in order,“if you’d normally read the chapters of a book in order,” and really she’s absolutely right. Nevertheless, I went on to read the eighteen books then in print in totally random order, as inter-library loan delivered them to me. Sorting out the meta-order, which is utterly apparent if you read them normally, became the thing I did to get myself back to sleep when I woke up in the night. For some reason, I couldn’t find The Nutmeg of Consolation for months, and trying to deduce the events of it drove me mad. I eventually bought it—the first one I bought.

My second read was in order. Waterstones, then my local bookshop, did a promotion selling the first book for a pound. I then read all of them in order, buying the ones that weren’t on the shelves in libraries in walking distance. When I lived in Sketty, there was a library about a hundred yards away, on the street I lived on. There was also a central library in town, about a mile away. I used to walk in and get the bus back: books are heavy. So I read them in order, which was nice, and I owned about half of them. Then my husband started reading them. He was working in Cambridge at the time, and coming home for weekends, and he started taking one with him for the train journey. He bought me all the ones I didn’t have, filling in the gaps so that I had a complete set.

I have just started what is either my fifth or sixth re-read.

The thing that’s so great about these books isn’t that they’re historically accurate and give a picture of the whole planet at the turn of the nineteenth century. They certainly do that, but if that were all I wouldn’t get homesick for them. It’s not the character portrait of the two very different central men—bluff, good-natured Jack Aubrey with his desire for riches and promotion, and the Irish naturalist doctor Stephen Maturin. They are great portraits, and change splendidly over time, and I’m very fond of both of them, faults notwithstanding. It’s not the way O’Brian contrives to gives you information in an interesting way after you want it and before you need it, though I admire that extremely. Nor is it the way he does such astonishing things between volumes and when you’re not looking, such that you see the consequences and not the events. It certainly isn’t the nautical jargon—I’m sure Jack knows what cross-catharpings are, but Stephen and I couldn’t care less. It’s not the plot—though the books have very good plots and the series as a whole has the most excellent swell of plot that runs through it. It’s not even the fact that Stephen calls Jack “my dear” in the least affected way possible.

The truly great thing about these books is that they suck you into their world and while you are reading you are entirely caught up within it, and it is as alien and fascinating a world as anything you might find around another star. And you don’t question it, it’s absolutely real, and you are head down inside it. I want to compare them to Cherryh and Bujold and Vinge and Brust.

If you haven’t read them then you are very lucky because you can still read them for the first time. Having said that, they are books I find much more comfortable to re-read knowing what’s going to happen than I did the first time through—O’Brian has a tendency to throw things at you hard that can leave you breathless.

What I usually do is alternate the first few with other books and then get so immersed in O’Brian that I can’t stop. I’ve just re-read Master and Commander and will be doing a weekly read-along of the series starting today and featuring every Monday. This series of posts will be with spoilers, as there’s no other way to talk about them…

Continue

I would just like to note that I couldn’t find a way to get in contact with Jo Walton to request permission to post her essays (I tried to use the Shoutbox on the Tor blog, but I don’t think it worked), which is why I’m only posting the introduction and then sending you on to her blog. If anyone knows how to get in touch with the author, I’d love to be able to ask her if I can post all of the essays.

Courtesy of Jo Walton.
Image courtesy of Amazon.com.

Between Johnny Depp and numerous sports logos, pirates have become cartoon characters in modern culture. It’s easy to forget that the real thing did exist, and that in many cases they were much more badass than the Hollywood version.

Don’t take the word “badass” the wrong way; these men were unspeakably violent, often mass murderers and slaveholders. They were pirates, real pirates, not goofy caricatures. Here’s proof.

#7. Francois l’Olonnais Eats a Fucking Heart, Holy Shit

French pirate Francois l’Olonnais really, really hated Spain. Early in his pirating days, l’Olonnais was almost killed by Spanish raiders, and instead of reconsidering his career choice and becoming a dairy farmer or something, he decided he would spend the rest of his life on an anti-Spain rampage. He let them know exactly what he intended by beheading everyone in the crew of a Spanish ship except one man, sending him back with this message: “I shall never henceforward give quarter to any Spaniard whatsoever.”

That was just the beginning, though. Considering what happened next, it looks like those beheaded Spaniards were actually the lucky ones.

Having made a reputation for himself, l’Olonnais raised a pirate fleet of eight ships and hundreds of men and proceeded to terrorize the coast of South America, sacking Spanish-ruled cities, capturing treasure ships returning to Spain and generally being a huge pain in the ass to anything Spain-related. Presumably he also killed his fair share of Portuguese sailors during this time, because really who can tell the difference?

However, the situation was reversed when l’Olonnais himself, returning from pillaging the coast of Venezuela, was ambushed by a much larger force of Spanish soldiers. With his pirate buddies being blown to pieces left and right, l’Olonnais narrowly managed to escape and somehow captured a few Spanish hostages along the way. The problem now was that l’Olonnais and the other survivors needed to know which way to escape so they didn’t run into more Spanish ships, which they weren’t in any condition to fight. What to do?

Easy: l’Olonnais drew his sword, sliced into one Spanish prisoner’s chest, pulled out the heart with his hands and began to “bite and gnaw it with his teeth, like a ravenous wolf, saying to the rest: ‘I will serve you all alike, if you show me not another way.’”

While we wouldn’t recommend you use this technique the next time you need directions to the nearest Taco Bell, in this case it apparently worked like a charm. The pirates escaped safely. So if you were wondering what happened to all the heads of the decapitated Spaniards we mentioned earlier … well, let’s just say the whole crew dined like kings for like a week.

#6. Jean Laffite Tells King George to Suck It

Jean Laffite, despite his effeminate name and Frenchness, was an honest to goodness pirate king. He led an entire pirate island in Louisiana, capturing ships and smuggling stolen goods into New Orleans. He was so successful that when the Governor of Louisiana offered a $300 price for his capture (back when 300 bucks was half the national budget) Laffite responded by offering a $1,000 reward for the capture of the governor.

The media and the authorities painted Laffite as a dangerously evil mastermind and mass murderer, the Osama bin Laden of the 1800s, if you will. Apparently his reputation spread across the Atlantic, because in 1814, Laffite was approached by the British and handed a letter signed by King George III himself, promising citizenship and landholdings if he joined their side. Also, if he refused they would tear his little island to pieces, and sell it for scrap. Laffite said he needed a few days to think about it … and ran straight to New Orleans and warned the Americans that the English were coming.

You see, the United States may not have been a very big fan of Jean Laffite, but Laffite was apparently a huge fan of the U.S. of A.

Even though he wasn’t American, Laffite watched the new country with great admiration and ordered his entire fleet never to attack an American ship. The one time a pirate disregarded his order, Laffite killed the guy himself. He was also known for treating captured crew well and sometimes returning their ships if they weren’t fit for pirating. Laffite was a hero among the people of New Orleans, since his smuggling operation allowed them to buy stuff they otherwise couldn’t afford.

So how did the U.S. respond when he warned them about the English? Why, by raiding his island and locking up his men, figuring he was full of shit. It wasn’t until badass future president Andrew Jackson stepped in and pointed out that New Orleans wasn’t prepared for a British attack that the authorities agreed to release Laffite’s men if they agreed to assist the U.S. Navy — which, at the time, consisted of a fraction of the ships in Laffite’s personal pirate fleet.

It’s a good thing, too, because the pirates were pretty much the only reason New Orleans didn’t fall to the British, which would have been a huge strategic victory. New Orleans could have given the British a place to gather their forces before attacking the rest of the country. Think about it: The U.S. might not even exist today if it weren’t for this unwashed French “terrorist.”

#5. Stephen Decatur: All-American Pirate

Stephen Decatur doesn’t really fall into the stereotypical image of a pirate, in that he was actually a respected U.S. Navy officer. Decatur was the youngest man to reach the rank of captain in the history of the navy, which sounds like a bullshit line of expository dialogue from an unbelievably stupid Hollywood film trailer. But in this case, it happens to be true. He was also the first American celebrated as a national military hero who didn’t play a role in the American Revolution — hell, they even put his face on $20 notes.

So how did he get to be so famous? Why, by pulling off some of the most epic (and bloody) sea raids of all time.

For example, when the USS Philadelphia was captured by Tripolitan pirates in 1803, the 25-year-old Decatur gathered a group of men, disguised them as Maltese sailors and infiltrated the enemy harbor armed only with swords and pikes. Did they recover the ship? Nope — they overtook the entire crew without losing a single man and set it on fire just so the pirates couldn’t use it. Admiral Horatio Nelson, the same man who had his arm removed so that he could get back to battle, called the raid “the most bold and daring act of the age.”

But wait, there’s more. Later, as Decatur was returning from seizing another ship with a crew twice as large as his, he learned that his brother had been shot while fighting the pirates. Even though the whole crew was exhausted from the latest raid, Decatur turned around and chased the enemy ship, which he and 10 other men proceeded to board.

Disregarding everyone else, Decatur, a Liam Neeson-like machine of vengeance, went straight after the man who shot his brother and killed him. The rest of the crew eventually surrendered, leaving Decatur with 27 prisoners and 33 dead pirates in a single day.

Again: he was 25.

#4. Blackbeard’s Mentor, Benjamin Hornigold, Just Didn’t Give a Shit

Benjamin Hornigold was the Emperor Palpatine to Blackbeard’s Darth Vader. While his protege went on to become the most famous pirate of all time, Hornigold went on to become a footnote in hundreds of books with the word “Blackbeard” on the cover. Still, for our money, Hornigold is where it’s at, even though you’ve probably never heard of him before.

Hornigold started his career of piracy in the Bahamas with little more than a few canoes. A few years later, he had a huge fucking 30-gun warship, possibly the most heavily armed in the area. This made sailing over to merchant ships and stealing their goods and booze extremely easy. So easy, in fact, that he apparently did it just for shits and kicks. Which leads us to the story that, to us, is Benjamin Hornigold in a nutshell:

Hornigold overtook a merchant ship in Honduras and the only thing he demanded was everyone’s hat. He explained to the puzzled crew that his pirates got drunk and lost their hats the night before, then took off without stealing anything else.

This was not an isolated incident. Another time, a captured crew reported that Hornigold let them go having taken “only some rum, a little sugar, powder and shott.”

Sadly, it looks like his crew didn’t share his priorities. Hornigold always considered himself a “privateer” rather than a pirate, and to prove it he refused to attack British ships. His men didn’t share this delusion and eventually deposed him, with a good part of his crew and ships going to that asshole Blackbeard. Who subsequently lost his head.

Hornigold eventually retired as a pirate, but rather than simply moving to a condo and taking up golf (or whatever the 18th century equivalent of that was), he accepted a royal pardon and became a pirate hunter — being tasked with chasing some of the same guys he used to run with.

#3. William Dampier, Science Pirate

Englishman William Dampier was a bit of an overachiever. Not content with being the first man to circumnavigate the world three times and becoming a celebrated author and scientific explorer, he also had a little hobby: raiding Spanish settlements and plundering other people’s ships. All in the name of science, of course.

Pop culture demands that all pirates be toothless hobos who talk like fucking idiots, but Dampier was the exact opposite of that: he didn’t just respect the English language, he actually expanded it. The Oxford English Dictionary cites Dampier’s writing over a thousand times, since he provided the first written example for words like “barbecue,” “avocado,” “chopsticks” and hundreds of others.

Dampier has been called the first natural historian of Australia — he was the first person ever to describe things like the “large hopping animal” and the “midget bear with a fondness for humping trees”[citation needed]. Dampier’s contribution to Western culture is so massive that Darwin based his work on evolution off of his observations and Gulliver’s Travels specifically mentions how awesome he is.

His most badass moment has nothing to do with science or literature, though. In 1688, when his first trip around the world was almost over, Dampier told his crew to eat a dick and voluntarily marooned himself off the coast of Thailand, otherwise known as “the middle of fucking nowhere.” He grabbed a native canoe and sailed off on his own, showing up in England three years later, completely penniless, carrying nothing but his journals … and, um, a tattooed slave prince.

At this point he published his first book, which was an immediate success, also making a little money on the side by showing off his new friend.

#2. Black Bart Dishes Out Some Sea Justice

In the 17th and 18th centuries, sailing with the navy or on a merchant vessel was a shitty, shitty job. The conditions were miserable, and if you did anything to piss off the officers of the ship, punishment was brutal and often deadly. The job was so harsh that nobody wanted to do it, so the navy and the merchants would literally kidnap people out of the ports and force them to work on their ships. Shockingly, this was later proven to not be such a fantastic way to engender the loyalty of one’s crew.

Bartholomew Roberts (or “Black Bart”) was a reluctant pirate himself, which didn’t make him any less good at his job. Roberts happened to be working in a slave ship that was captured by pirates — when the pirates “asked” the crew to join them, he looked at his measly salary and figured, “Why the hell not?” Also, there’s a pretty good chance they threatened to kill him if he didn’t. Roberts quickly became the pirate captain’s trusted confidant because of his intelligence and navigation skills. When the captain was killed, Roberts (who had only been with the pirates for six weeks) was elected as the crew’s new leader, reportedly stating “Better being a commander than a common man.”

Roberts went on to become a legendary pirate on his own merits, but apparently he never forgot where he came from: After capturing a ship and before taking his pick of the booty, he would ask the captured crew whether or not they were treated well by the captain and officers. If any of the commanding officers or the captain received complaints, he’d slice and dice them to the cheers of those they mistreated. This was actually a common practice among some pirates, some of whom used more elaborate forms of punishment, like making the torturers run in circles for 10 minutes while the men stuck forks, knives and compasses into their butts.

Roberts, a civilized man, eventually forced his crew (the same crew who captured him months earlier) to agree to a strict 11-point code of conduct, including articles like no gambling for money, no women on board, lights go out at 8 p.m., keep your shit clean and “If any man rob another he shall have his nose and ears slit, and be put ashore where he shall be sure to encounter hardships.”

#1. Barbarossa Says Fuck It, Starts Own Nation

When you look at movie or TV pirate captains, they’re always lucky if they have one ship and a few dozen men to follow their orders. It turns out some real-life pirates had it slightly better than that. Ottoman pirate Hayreddin “Redbeard” Barbarossa didn’t just have his own fleet — he had his own damn country.

Barbarossa started out as a legitimate merchant sailor in the 16th century, but was forced to flee the Eastern Mediterranean after backing the wrong candidate for sultan. Becoming a pirate, he started attacking Christian ships around what’s now Tunisia until his enemies took his base, leaving him homeless once again. Tired of getting kicked out of countries all the time, Barbarossa went ahead and started one for himself: the Regency of Algiers (present-day Algeria, Tunisia and parts of Morocco). He did this by pledging alliance to the Ottoman sultan and getting in return enough ships and weapons to blow the shit out of whoever lived there before him.

How big of a deal did this guy become? Let’s put it this way: At one point, Barbarossa single-handedly defeated the combined forces of Venice, the Vatican, Genoa, Spain, Portugal and Malta during the Battle of Preveza (1538), and by “single-handedly” we mean it was just him and 122 ships he commanded.

Courtesy of Eric Yosomono, Jean Flynn and Cracked.com
Image: Captain Bartholomew Roberts With Two Ships, artist unknown, courtesy of Wikipedia.

Was This The Real Stephen Maturin?
By Marion Diamond

Some years ago, I belonged to a History of Medicine online discussion group. Every few months, a query would arrive from a newbie asking what was the disease once known as the marthambles – and the questioner would immediately be outed as a Patrick O’Brien tragic, for it is one of many ailments successfully treated by Stephen Maturin in O’Brian’s highly popular Aubrey/Maturin novels, set in the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic War. The problem is, marthambles doesn’t exist. Sometimes a historical novelist is allowed – whisper it quietly – to make things up!

I first encountered Patrick O’Brian’s novels in the late 1970s. I was working in the Public Record Office in London (now the National Archives) on naval records for my PhD, and the archivist who helped me mentioned O’Brian, who was working on the same records for his latest novel.

Thanks to my conversation with the PRO archivist, I know how well researched those books are. Real historical characters appear throughout. Robert Farquhar, for instance, who becomes Governor of Mauritius in The Mauritius Command (1977), is certainly a real person: he was the consul at Ambon when John Macarthur visited there in 1802, and I’ve been writing the biography of his cousin, Walter Stevenson Davidson, for too many years.

I’m not a great reader of historical fiction and I haven’t read the whole O’Brian series, but some of my nearest and dearest are fans, and you can pick up a lot through marital osmosis. So I know the rough outline of the characters and stories.

Stephen Maturin is a half Catalan revolutionary on the run from the authorities when he encounters Captain Jack Aubrey at the British naval base at Port Mahon, on Minorca. A skilled doctor, he becomes a ship’s surgeon in the Royal Navy. He performs many surgical miracles, but he is also a scientist, curious about the new discoveries in botany and physics, a linguist and a spy.

Stephen Maturin is no doubt a composite of many medical men who served in the Royal Navy, both during and after the Napoleonic Wars. Ships surgeons generally had a reputation for drunken incompetence, but many were caring, educated men – though not many fitted as many adventures into their careers as Maturin.

It’s tempting to look for possible models, so may I offer for consideration Exhibit A:

Augustus Bozzi was born in Milan in 1783. His father’s family was connected to the Bonapartes of Corsica, while his maternal grandmother was English. He studied medicine at the University of Pavia, and was briefly imprisoned for his republicanism. After he graduated, he travelled in a theatre troupe, singing and playing the guitar. In Corfu he met William R. Hamilton, an attaché to Lord Elgin, the British ambassador in Constantinople, and travelled with him in Greece, where together they oversaw the removal of the Elgin marbles from Athens.

Bozzi joined the medical service of the Turkish navy, before transferring to the Royal Navy. He worked on various ships in the Mediterranean, the West Indies and South America, where he met Simon Bolivar. In 1811 he carried documents from Bolivar to Sir Robert Peel in London. During this time he suffered from – and treated himself for – both malaria and yellow fever. He married an Englishwoman, and adopted his English grandmother’s name, Granville. Brought up Catholic, he converted to Anglicanism.

Bozzi Granville finally retired from the navy in 1813. His old friend William Hamilton’s brother was the brother-in-law of Robert Farquhar, the Governor of Mauritius, and Robert’s father, Sir Walter Farquhar, was the Prince Regent’s physician. With various letters of introduction, these connections gave him entrée into the medical establishment. On Sir Walter’s advice, he studied at La Maternité in Paris, before setting himself up as a specialist physician in women’s diseases in London.

Granville was a man of science. He was friendly with the chemist John Dalton, and for many years was the secretary to the Royal Institution. In 1825 he conducted the first autopsy on an Egyptian mummy, Irtyersenu, a woman of about 50. Like the good gynaecologist he was, he identified her cause of death as an ovarian tumour, though recently Irtyersenu has been re-examined, and she is now thought to have died of tuberculosis.

We will never know how Stephen Maturin’s life might have ended – but Augustus Bozzi Granville lived a long and fruitful life. He died in 1868, leaving a 2 volume autobiography which is the basis for almost everything we know about his life before he settled in England. It is a thoroughly entertaining book – and very likely, I suspect, a work of historical fiction as vividly creative as anything that Patrick O’Brian ever wrote.

Further reading:

A. B. Granville, Autobiography of A. B. Granville, ed. P. B. Granville, 2 vols. (1874)

W.B.Howell, ‘Augustus Bozzi Granville – Journeyman Physician’, in Canadian Medical Association Journal, December 19 1931, pp. 719-25.

Helen D. Donoghue, Oona Y.-C. Lee, David E. Minnikin, Gurdyal S. Besra, John H. Taylor, and Mark Spigelman, ‘Tuberculosis in Dr Granville’s mummy: a molecular re-examination of the earliest known Egyptian mummy to be scientifically examined and given a medical diagnosis’, in Proceedings of the Royal Society of Biological Sciences, January 7 2010; 277(1678): 51–56.

Ornella Moscucci, ‘Granville, Augustus Bozzi (1783–1872)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/view/article/11299, accessed 25 Nov 2011]

Courtesy of Historians Are Past Caring

Excerpt from The Royal Navy, A History From the Earliest Times to the Present Day
By William Clowes

At the close of 1808, four French 40-gun frigates, the Venus, Manche, Bellone, and Caroline, had escaped unobserved from various ports in the French empire, and had sailed for Mauritius, with orders to avoid all British warships, and to harass commerce [45]. The Caroline, Lieutenant J. B. H. Feretier, proceeded to the Bay of Bengal, and there, on May 31st, 1809, sighted the Indiamen Streatham, 30, John Dale, master, Europe, 30, William Gelston, master, and Lord Keith, 12, Peter Campbell, master, of whose force and character full particulars had been obtained from an American skipper. The three Indiamen formed line of battle as well as they could, but a great distance separated the two most powerful ships, the Streatham and the Europe. The Caroline attacked the sternmost of the three, the Europe, and, after half an hour’s sharp fighting, left her in a disabled state. The French frigate then made sail ahead, engaged the Streatham, which had not as yet fired a shot, and, in an hour, disabled her and compelled her to strike. The Lord Keith remained, but the Caroline could not secure her without sacrificing one or other of the two craft that had been already engaged. Accordingly, after firing a few shots at her, the Frenchman returned to the Europe, and resumed action. The Europe at first answered the fire, but soon attempted to escape. She was speedily overhauled and captured by the Caroline, after that ship had placed a party on board the Streatham [86]. The British vessels were indifferently manoeuvred, and were in consequence beaten in detail. In force, three weakly-manned, heavily-laden, and encumbered Indiamen were, however, no match for one powerful frigate.

On August 14th (1809), the Otter, 18, Commander Nisbet Josiah Willoughby, discovered three French vessels at anchor under the batteries of Riviere Noire, in Mauritius, and sent in her boats at night, under Lieutenant John Burns, to cut them out. One of the three vessels was boarded and carried; but the alarm was given, and the batteries opened a heavy fire. The prize was found to be so firmly secured to the shore that she could not be brought off, and had to be abandoned. The British boats then retired, with a loss of 1 killed, 1 wounded.

In September, Commodore Josias Rowley, in concert with Lieut.-Colonel Henry S. Keating, commanding the British garrison at Rodriguez, a small island which, being eastward of Mauritius, had been previously occupied as a base for the British blockading squadrons off Reunion and Mauritius, determined upon a conjoint expedition for the capture of St. Paul, the only good harbour in the island of Reunion [136]. The vessels engaged were

Raisonnable, 64, Commodore Josias Rowley.

Sirius, 36, Capt. Samuel Pym.

Boadicea, 38, Capt. John Hatley

Nereide, 36, Capt. Robert Corbett.

Otter, 18, Commander Nisbet Josiah Willoughby.

Wasp (East India Co.’s Schooner), -, Watkins.

A force of 368 troops was embarked [145]. On September 21st the Nereide disembarked the troops, and 236 seamen and Marines under Commander Willoughby, at Pointe des Galets, five miles from St. Paul. The men advanced rapidly, seized the causeway over the Etang de St. Paul, captured three batteries with but trifling resistance, and turned the guns on the shipping in the harbour, where lay the French 40-gun frigate Caroline [149]. Two other batteries completely dominating the harbour were carried in quick succession, while the British squadron in the bay stood in close, poured a heavy fire into the Caroline, and finally anchored off the town. The Caroline, Grappler, 16, and the Indiamen Streatham and Europe, had cut their cables when the British squadron approached, and had, in consequence, drifted ashore. They were all got off without injury by the seamen of the squadron, and St. Paul, with 125 guns of all kinds, fell into the hands of the British.

The naval loss was 7 killed, 18 wounded, and 1 missing. The place was taken by surprise from the land, in spite of strong defences which fronted towards the sea. As the roads ran along the coast, and troops moving by them could be attacked by the fire of the British ships, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the French to recover the ground which they had lost. The British force was re-embarked, after destroying the fortifications and guns, but, on the 22nd, as French troops could be seen approaching from the hills to the south of the town, a party of Marines and seamen was again landed under Willoughby. It destroyed a government store-house, containing silk to the value of 500,000 Pounds Sterling [156], and re-embarked. On the 23rd, terms were arranged with the French, by which all public property was to be surrendered, and the British were to be unmolested in removing it. On the 28th, the British withdrew from St. Paul, carrying with them their prizes.

On November 2nd, the British sloop Victor, 18, Commander Edward Stopford, was chased in the Bay of Bengal by the French frigate Bellone, 40. The British vessel had her masts and rigging badly damaged, and was compelled to strike, having had 2 wounded [174].

In the course of (1810), beginning in April, a most important series of operations began in the Indian Ocean. The ultimate result of these was the capture of the last remaining French bases in those waters Reunion and Mauritius. The French ships on the station were the Venus, Bellone, and Manche, all of 40 guns, to which must be added the Minerve (ex Minerva), also of 40 guns, which had been captured from the Portuguese [174], and the brig Entreprenante. If James can be believed, to complete the crew of the Minerve the French had recourse to prisoners taken from the various British ships captured, a large number of whom were Irish Catholics. The British squadron, which comprised the Leopard, 50, Iphigenia, 36, Magicienne, 36, and some small craft, was unable to maintain a strict blockade. Late in April, it was reinforced by the Nereide, 36, Commander Nisbet Josiah Willoughby (actg. Capt.). The Nereide proceeded to Riviere-Noire on the south coast of Mauritius, off which was to be her cruising ground. There, on April 24th, she discovered the French frigate Astree, 36 [217], also newly arrived, at anchor under the batteries; and she opened fire on her at long range without much effect. On the 30th, she observed a large merchantman at anchor under the batteries of Jacolet, and in the evening sent in her boats, Willoughby himself taking command, to capture the ship. In spite of the fire of two French batteries, the boatparty landed, stormed the first battery and spiked its guns, and then drove back a detachment of French militia, capturing from them two field pieces. Day broke and revealed to the British the second battery beyond the river Galet, which, it could be seen, was held by a strong body of French militia. The British seamen, however, boldly swam the stream or forded it, carried the second battery and drove the militia before them in ignominious flight. Returning, they found that the garrison of the first battery had rallied. Willoughby immediately threatened its line of retreat, whereupon it ran, leaving him leisure to destroy the signal-station, to carry off the schooner Estafette, and to examine the merchantman, which proved to be American and was for that reason not touched [217]. The British loss was only 1 killed and 7 wounded. Of the French, three officers were made prisoners.

Willoughby, a few weeks later, was most severely wounded by the bursting of a musket whilst exercising his men on Flat Island, an islet to the north of Mauritius, which was used by the British squadron as its base. His jaw was fractured, and his larynx was laid bare, but happily he recovered. He will soon be again met with.

Early in the summer of 1810, elaborate preparations began to be made for the capture of Reunion, or, as it was then called, Bourbon. Large numbers of British and Indian troops, together with transports, were assembled at Rodriguez; and on June 24th, the Boadicea, 38, Captain Josias Rowley, and Nereide, 36, Captain Nisbet Josiah Willoughby, from off Mauritius, arrived to escort the expedition. On July 3rd, they sailed again [220]; and on the 6th, made a rendezvous, about 50 miles from Reunion, with a small squadron which, under Captain Samuel Pym, of the Sirius, 36, had previously been cruising off Mauritius. This squadron consisted of the Iphigenia, 36, Captain Henry Lambert, and Magicienne, 36, Captain Lucius Curtis, besides the Sirius. At the rendezvous the troops, 3650 in number, were divided, and arrangements were perfected; and on the 7th, the ships bore away for the different points of disembarkation. The first brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Frazier, was to land at Grande Chaloupe, about six miles west of St. Denis, the capital, and the remaining three brigades, under Lieut.-Colonels Henry S. Keating (senior officer), Campbell, and Drummond, were to be thrown ashore at Riviere des Pluies, about three miles to the eastward. In the afternoon, while the enemy, who had about 600 regulars and 2700 militia in the island, was distracted by a demonstration off Ste. Marie [224], Frazier, with 950 men and some howitzers, was landed at Grande Chaloupe without opposition; and Lieutenant John Wyatt Watling, of the Sirius, occupied a height which protected the force from molestation during the following night. At Riviere des Pluies, on the weather side of the island, conditions were less favourable; and, although Willoughby, still suffering from his musket accident, effected a landing with a few seamen and about 150 troops, the operation was not carried out without the drowning of four people in the surf, and the loss of several boats [227]. Further disembarkation at that point was therefore abandoned for the time. Willoughby, and Lieut.-Colonel M’Leod, who was in command of the detachment of troops, occupied, and spent that night in, Fort Ste. Marie [230].

On the 8th, the Boadicea disembarked Keating and some troops at Grande Chaloupe; and the Iphigenia and transports landed some more; but, in the meantime, Frazier had been so active that Colonel Ste. Susanne, the military commander, asked for a truce. At 6 P.M., the island capitulated, the conquest having cost the victors only 22 killed and drowned, and 79 wounded [233]. It fell to the Sirius to take possession of the shipping in the bay of St. Paul. On the 9th, the privateer brig Edward, of Nantes, made sail and put to sea to escape; but the frigate’s barge, under Lieutenant William Norman, rowed hard after her for nearly twelve hours, and, catching her, boarded and carried her most gallantly, having 3 men slightly wounded. She had dispatches for France on board. Mr. Robert Townshend Farquhar, who had been sent out for the purpose, assumed the post of governor of Reunion.

Immediately after the surrender of Reunion, the Sirius returned to her station off Mauritius, where her boats, under Lieutenants William Norman and John Wyatt Watling, destroyed a schooner which was aground, covered by two field pieces and 300 men. In retiring, the British lost 1 killed and 1 wounded.

Towards the end of July, in addition to the Sirius, 36, Captain Samuel Pym, the Iphigenia, 36, Captain Henry Lambert, Nereide, 36, Captain Nisbet Josiah Willoughby, and Staunch, 14, Lieutenant Benjamin Street, cruised off Mauritius. In the Nereide were 12 Madras artillerymen, 50 grenadiers of the 69th Regt., and 50 of the 33rd Regt., the whole under Captain Todd of the 69th. These had been put on board by Lieut.-Colonel Keating, with a view to co-operating in a projected attack on Ile de la Passe, a small island off Grand Port on the south-east side of Mauritius, which it was intended to use as a base for political agitations as well as for military operations in the colony. Accordingly, on August 10th, having left Lambert, in the Iphigenia, off Port Louis, on the west coast, Pym, with the other vessels, proceeded off Grand Port, and, that evening, in terrible weather, tried to effect a landing on Ile de la Passe. The boats, however, lost their way, or fouled one another; and the attempt had to be abandoned [240]. On the following morning Pym picked up his people, and, to lull suspicion, bore away and rejoined Lambert off Port Louis. It was there arranged that the frigates should return to the eastward by different routes, the Sirius going round by the longer or northern way, and the Nereide, accompanied by the Staunch, beating up from the south end of the island, so that the enemy should not readily perceive that any organised movement was in progress [241]. Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, with two boats, was temporarily lent by the Iphigenia to the Sirius.

The Sirius reappeared before Ile de la Passe on August 13th, when, however, the other craft were still far to leeward. Anxious to effect a surprise, Pym decided not to wait for his consorts, and in the evening sent in five boats, containing 71 officers and men under Lieutenants William Norman, John Wyatt Watling, and Henry Ducie Chads, together with Lieutenants (R.M.) James Cottell and William Bate. The attack was most successful, although the enemy opened fire before the boats had landed [245]. Norman fell, shot through the heart as he was endeavouring to enter a battery; but Watling took his place, carried the work in spite of a determined resistance, and then crossing the islet, joined hands with Chads, who had been similarly successful on the south-east side. Thereupon the French garrison, of about 80 regulars, surrendered, having inflicted a loss of 7 killed and 18 wounded.

On the following morning the Nereide and Staunch arrived, and Pym, giving charge of Ile de la Passe to Willoughby, sailed to rejoin the Iphigenia off Port Louis. Willoughby garrisoned the place with 50 of the grenadiers, under Captain Todd, and at once began preparations for further attacks.

On August 17th, Willoughby landed at Canaille de Bois, near Grand Port, with about 170 seamen, Marines, and soldiers, for the purpose of distributing among the inhabitants of Mauritius a proclamation of Governor Farquhar, of Reunion. He moved twenty miles into the enemy’s country, and, incidentally, attacked and carried a fort at Pointe du Diable, spiking eight guns and two mortars, blowing up the magazines, and carrying off a 13-in. mortar. The French made little resistance, and caused no loss to the British; and Willoughby returned to his frigate in the evening. On the 18th he again landed and destroyed the signal station, etc., at Grande Riviere, in face of a body of seven or eight hundred Frenchmen. Soon afterwards the Staunch left him, and proceeded to Port Louis. On the 19th and 20th further expeditions were made on shore, the inhabitants being tolerably friendly, and the enemy’s troops not interfering.

But on the 20th the entire situation, until then apparently so favourable for a speedy conquest of the island, was suddenly changed. A strange squadron, which proved to be the French Bellone, 40, Commodore V. G. Duperre, Minerve, 40, Commander P. F. H. E. Bouvet, and Victor, 16, Commander N. Morice, with the prize Indiamen Windham and Ceylon, was sighted in the offing [251]. Realising that if the three men-of-war should form a junction with the French vessels then in the harbour of Port Louis, the British force on that part of the station would be hopelessly overmatched, Willoughby hoisted French colours, and, by means of a hostile signal-book which he had taken, induced the headmost of the new comers to enter Grand Port. As they did so, he substituted British for French colours, and poured so heavy a broadside into the Victor, the leading vessel, that she instantly struck, and anchored on his starboard quarter [253]. But when the Minerve, followed by the Ceylon, entered soon afterwards, she ordered the Victor to cut her cable; and this the corvette did, rejoining her consorts. Both the Nereide and the fort on Ile de la Passe fired at the advancing enemy; but an accidental explosion in the fort put a number of the men there out of action, and six of the guns were quickly dismounted by the French broadsides [254]. At that time some of the British frigate’s boats, containing about 160 of her officers and men, narrowly escaped being cut off by the Minerve and Ceylon, which were between them and their ship; but, owing to some inexplicable mistake on the part of the enemy, they were suffered to rejoin without even being fired at.

When the Minerve, Ceylon, and Victor had passed in towards Grand Port, it looked for a few moments as if the Bellone and Windham were about to bear away for some other harbour. Willoughby, gallantly determined that he would not retire before the Minerve and Victor, was preparing to remove the remnant of the troops from Ile de la Passe, preparatory to attacking the enemy, when he perceived that the Bellone had left the Windham to proceed alone to the westward, and was bearing up after her consorts. The Nereide therefore made ready to receive her. The Bellone passed in at 2.45 P.M., exchanging broadsides with the Nereide, and killing 2 men and wounding 1, but doing less damage than might have been expected looking to the closeness of the range. At 4 o’clock Willoughby sent away Lieutenant Henry Colins Deacon in the launch, to inform Pym, off Port Louis, of the arrival of the French, and to say that with one frigate besides the Nereide, he would go in and attack them. As it happened, the Nereide, which was then to seaward of her enemies, could have herself weighed and joined the Sirius; but her Captain had been ordered to protect Ile de la Passe, and, perhaps quixotically, he decided to do so as long as possible. His subsequent defence of his charge was certainly one of the most remarkable on record.

Soon after the French had taken up their anchorage off Grand Port, Willoughby ordered his mortars on Ile de la Passe to try the range, the result being that the vessels presently shifted their billets to points somewhat further removed from the Nereide [257]. Willoughby also sent in a flag of truce to demand the surrender of the Victor, on the ground that she had struck to him. He thus assumed from the first an undaunted attitude, while, at the same time, he did all that lay in his power, by means of works on the islet, and by rowing guard, to defend his position pending the arrival of reinforcements.

It has been mentioned that the prize Indiaman, Windham, proceeded to the westward, instead of entering Grand Port with her consorts. On the 21st, as she was about to make Riviere Noire, on the south-west of Mauritius, she was sighted by the Sirius, which chased, but failed, in consequence of the wind, in an attempt to cut her off from the protection of the batteries. Not knowing what she was, Lieutenant John Wyatt Watling volunteered to catch her and board her with the launch. He went off with five seamen, and was followed by Midshipman John Andrews, in the jolly-boat, with four men; yet, strange to say, neither boat took in her a single weapon. Watling soon discovered the approximate force of his enemy; but, having consulted with Andrews, pushed on with extra-ordinary pluck, and, arming the men with the stretchers, actually boarded and carried an Indiaman mounting 26 guns, and manned by at least 30 Frenchmen, without loss. Moreover he managed to bring her out from under the batteries.

Captain Pym had not then received the message sent him by the hands of Lieutenant Deacon, but, learning from his prisoners something of the situation off Grand Port, he despatched the Windham to Commodore Josias Rowley, who was at St. Paul’s Bay, Reunion, and sent the Magicienne, 36, Captain Lucius Curtis, to pick up the Iphigenia, 36, Captain Henry Lambert, and Staunch, 14, off Port Louis, and to proceed with them to Ile de la Passe, while he himself went thither by the south of the island. General Decaen, at Port Louis, seems to have got wind of these movements, for, in consequence of his communications to Duperre, the latter, on the 21st, moored his ships, with springs, in the form of a crescent off Grand Port, in a position where the ends of his line were protected by reefs. The Sirius met the launch containing Lieutenant Deacon, and, on the morning of the 22nd, arrived off Ile de la Passe, and exchanged numbers with the Nereide, Willoughby characteristically signalling, ” Ready for action. Enemy of inferior force.” [258]. Pym, with as little delay as possible, led in to the attack, the Nereide falling into station behind him; but, having no competent pilot onboard, the Sirius unhappily piled up on a shoal on the left hand of the channel. Willoughby brought up, and went on board his consort to assist in floating her; yet this could not be effected until 8.30 A.M. on August 23rd, when the Sirius anchored near the Nereide. An hour and a half later, the Iphigenia and Magicienne were seen, and at 2.10 P.M. they also anchored in the channel. At 4.40, all four frigates weighed, and stood for Grand Port, it being arranged that the Nereide should anchor between the Victor, the rearmost ship, and the Bellone; the Sirius abreast of the Bellone; the Magicienne between the Ceylon and the Minerve; and the Iphigenia upon the broadside of the Minerve. The order of approach was, Nereide, Sirius, Magicienne, and Iphigenia. The Nereide passed in safely; but, unfortunately, the Sirius ran upon a coral rock before she got within range, and the Magicienne grounded on a bank in such a position that only three of her foremost guns would bear on the enemy, then distant about two cables. The Iphigenia promptly dropped her stream anchor and came to by the stern, then letting go her best bower under foot, and so bringing her starboard broadside to bear upon the Minerve, and at once pouring a heavy fire into that frigate at pistol shot distance. At the same time, Willoughby, seeing that the original plan of attack had failed, placed his frigate abeam of the Bellone, and not a cable’s length from her, and opened a furious cannonade upon his very superior antagonist. At 6.16 P.M., the Ceylon, thanks to the effect of the bow guns of the Magicienne and the quarter guns of the Iphigenia, was obliged to haul down her colours, though immediately afterwards she made sail in order to run ashore. A quarter of an hour later the Minerve, having her cable shot away, made sail after the Ceylon; and one or other of those ships, presently fouling the Bellone, compelled her also to cut and run aground, where, however, she lay so that her broadside still bore upon the Nereide. The Iphigenia would have followed up the Minerve, had not an intervening shoal prevented her from doing so. Shortly before 7 P.M. the Nereide’s spring was shot away, and the frigate swung stern on to the Bellone’s broadside, and was severely raked. To save herself, and to bring her starboard broadside to bear, she cut her small bower cable, and let go her best bower. The fire of the Minerve being then masked by that of the Bellone, and Duperre being wounded, Bouvet moved into the Bellone and took command. The following, from the Nereide’s log, continues the story:

“. . . Captain Willoughby severely wounded on the head. At 10, most of the quarter-deck and forecastle guns being dismounted, most of the guns disabled on the main deck, the squadron on shore and unable to render us any assistance, hulled from shipping and batteries, Nereide aground astern, Captain Willoughby ordered a boat to be sent to inform Captain Pym of our situation. At 10.30 the boat returned with orders for Captain Willoughby to repair on board the Sirius, which he declined doing. A boat was then ordered to the Bellone, to say we had struck, being entirely silenced, and a dreadful carnage on board. An officer came from the Iphigenia to know why we had ceased firing. At midnight, moderate rain, wind S.E. At 12.30 A.M. the main mast went by the board. At 1.30 several ropes on fire, which were luckily extinguished. Hoisted French colours in the fore rigging, the batteries and the Bellone still firing into us, although we hailed the latter to say we had struck. Perceiving the Union Jack, which had been nailed to the mizen mast-head, still flying, and no rigging or ropes to go aloft by, cut away the mizen mast [266], on which the enemy ceased firing. About 2 P.M., the Bellone’s boat boarded, spiked the guns, and took possession of the keys of the magazine. At 5 we observed the Magicienne’s quit her, she being on fire. At 11.30 she blew up. Iphigenia warping out. At 2 two French officers came on board, and committed the bodies of the slain to the deep. The Iphigenia trying to get the Sirius off. At 9, observed the boats to quit the Sirius, she being on fire. At 10 the boats came from the Bellone to land the prisoners. Wet the decks by order from the French officers, who were fearful the explosion from the Sirius should set fire to the Nereide, she being to leeward, and the wind strong…”

When she began the action, the Nereide had on board 281 souls, including 69 men of the 33rd and 69th Regiments, and of the Madras Artillery. Of these she appears to have had 92 killed, including Lieutenant John Burns, and Midshipman George Timmins, and about 137 wounded, including Willoughby, who had his left eye torn out, Lieutenant Henry Colins Deacon, Lieutenant (R.M.) Thomas S. Cox, Master William Lesby, Boatswain John Strong, and Midshipman Samuel Costerton. In all, the whole of the ship’s company, except 52 persons, was placed hors de combat. The Iphigenia lost 5 killed, and 13, including Lieutenant Robert Tom Blackler, wounded. The Magicienne lost 8 killed and 20 wounded. The Sirius, being nearly out of range, sustained neither loss nor damage; but both she and the Magicienne had to be destroyed by their people to save them from capture [268]. The loss in the French ships was officially stated at 37 killed and 112 wounded, the Bellone being the chief sufferer.

The Sirius blew up at 11 A.M. Her people, and some of her stores, as well as those of the Magicienne, had been removed to the Iphigenia, which, during the afternoon of the 25th, continued to warp out, but made little progress. In the evening, Pym sent off lieutenant Watling, in the pinnace, with dispatches for the Commander-in-Chief. Watling was chased by the Entreprenante, 14, which had that morning arrived off Ile de la Passe; but he escaped by pulling among the breakers, and, early on the 27th, reached St. Denis, Reunion. Continuously warping, the Iphigenia, on the 27th, reached a position under Ile de la Passe, cleared for action, and sent to the guns on the islet as many men as left her with between 400 and 500 people on board. Lambert desired to do his best to maintain the position, but, unfortunately, he was short of ammunition. Moreover, new forces were gathering against him. All the ships in Grand Port were by that time afloat, and, in addition, three fresh ships, with which the Entreprenante exchanged signals, were discovered outside. These were the 40-gun frigates Venus, Astree, and Manche, which, under Commodore Hamelin, had quitted Port Louis, then no longer blockaded, on the night of the 21st-22nd, but which had been delayed by adverse winds. At 5 P.M. on the 27th, Hamelin summoned Lambert to surrender. Lambert refused, but offered to surrender Ile de la Passe if his ship and people were allowed to retire to a British port. That night he sent Master John Jenkins, late of the Sirius, in the launch, to Reunion. On the following day, having been promised that the ship’s crew, and the garrison of the islet, should be sent to the Cape or to England, not to serve again until regularly exchanged, Lambert wisely surrendered to the fivefold superior force arrayed against him. There was some question of trying the gallant Willoughby for having distributed subversive proclamations on the island; but his bravery, and his terribly injured condition, decided his late foes not to proceed against him. The other prisoners were not well treated, nor were any of them, in accordance with the stipulations of August 28th, ever sent to the Cape or England. They were still in Mauritius at the time of its capture in the following December. The four Captains, and their officers and men, were soon afterwards tried for the loss of their ships, and were most honourably acquitted. In Willoughty’s case, the sentence ran: “The court is of opinion that the conduct of Captain Willoughby was injudicious in making the signal, ‘Enemy of inferior force,’ to the Sirius, she being the only ship in sight, and not justifiable, as the enemy evidently was superior. But the court is of opinion that his Majesty’s late ship Nereide was carried into battle in a most judicious, officer-like, and gallant manner; and the court cannot do otherwise than express its high admiration of the noble conduct of the Captain, officers, and ship’s company during the whole of the unequal contest, and is further of opinion that the Nereide was not surrendered to the enemy until she was disabled in every respect, so as to render all further resistance useless: and that no blame whatever attaches to them for the loss of the said ship.”

It has been said that Captain Pym despatched the Windham to Commodore Josias Rowley, with news of the state of affairs at Grand Port. The Windham reached St. Paul’s Bay, Reunion, on August 22nd. The commodore’s Ship, Boadicea, 38, at once took on board two companies of the 86th Regiment, and a detachment of artillery, and sailed the same evening, leaving the transport Bombay to follow as soon as possible with more troops, and with stores for Ile de la Passe. The Boadicea made slow progress. On the 27th, however, she learnt more of what had been going forward off Grand Port, for on that day she picked up the Magicienne’s barge, which, under Lieutenant Robert Wauchope, had been detached with letters by Captain Lambert on the previous day. When, on the 29th, she made Ile de la Passe, she found there the Venus and Manche [278], which chased her back to St. Denis, Reunion, and, on September 1st ,joined their consorts, the Astree and Entreprenante, in the harbour of Port Louise The Boadicea subsequently returned to Ile de la Passe, but, seeing that, single handed, she could effect nothing, went to St. Paul’s Bay, and re-anchored there on September 11th. Desiring to take full advantage of their success at Grand Port, the French formed a squadron, under Captain Bouvet, composed of the Iphiginie (late Iphigenia), Astree, and Entreprenante, to be subsequently joined by the Victor. The three first of these, on September 9th, began a cruise off Reunion. On that same day, the Africaine, 38, Captain Robert Corbett, on her way from England to Madras, touched at Rodriguez, and heard of the misfortunes in Mauritius. Corbett, therefore, changed his route, and steered to join Rowley at Reunion. On the way thither, on the 11th, he sighted and drove ashore near Cape Malheureux, Mauritius, the French dispatch vessel No. 23. In an attempt to destroy her, the British unhappily lost 2 killed and 16 wounded, and had to retire. Corbett made St. Denis, Reunion, early on the 12th, and found in the offing the Iphigenie and Astree. These were presently chased by the Boadicea, 38, the Otter, 16, Commander James Tomkinson, and the Staunch, 14, Lieutenant Benjamin Street, which had left St. Paul’s Bay for the purpose, and which were at once recognised by the Africaine. Corbett hastily took on board a few men of the 86th Regiment, and made sail to support his friends; but towards evening, while rapidly gaining on the chase, he lost sight of his consorts. During the night, however, he sent up rockets and burnt blue lights to indicate his position; and, in the early morning of the 13th, when he found himself close on the weather quarter of the Astree, the Boadicea was only four or five miles on his own lee quarter. As the enemy was nearing the shelter of Port Louis, Corbett pluckily attacked, without waiting for the Commodore to come up. He opened fire at 2.20 A.M., and, within a few seconds, was seriously wounded, the command devolving on Lieutenant Joseph Crew Tullidge, who fought the ship bravely until a few minutes before 5 A.M., when, having suffered terribly, and the Boadicea being still far off, the Africaine struck to her two opponents [285]. Of 295 people on board, she had 49 killed, including Master Samuel Parker, and 114 wounded, including Corbett (mortally), Lieutenants Tullidge and Robert Forder, Master’s Mates John Theed and Jenkin Jones, and Midshipmen Charles Mercier and Robert Leech. The French lost 9 killed and 33 wounded in the Iphigenie, and 1 killed and 2 wounded in the Astree. The Africaine was an utter wreck aloft. There is, unfortunately, much reason to suppose that Captain Corbett’s reputation for extreme severity had antagonised his crew, and that the men did not behave as loyally as they should have behaved. Brenton unwarrantably suggests that this gallant but harsh officer committed suicide, rather than become a prisoner.

Not long after the Africaine had struck, the Boadicea began to feel a strengthening breeze, and, coming up, passed within musket-shot of the enemy; but, instead of at once engaging, she tacked, and stood to windward to look for the Otter and Staunch. At 10 A.M. she was joined by them, and at 12.40 the three British vessels bore up with a fine breeze from S.S.E. As they approached the enemy, the Astree and Iphigenie abandoned their prize and made sail to windward; and at 5 P.M., the Africaine, after having fired a couple of guns, hauled down her French colours, and was taken possession of [291]. On September 15th, never having lost sight of the enemy for more than a few hours at a time, Rowley’s squadron anchored in St. Paul’s Bay, and, later in the day, the Commodore, with the Otter and Staunch, put to sea again to look for the French; but, though he saw them, no engagement resulted, and Rowley returned to St. Paul’s Bay on the 18th at 5 A.M.. In the interval, the Astree and Iphigenie captured the East India Company’s armed brig Aurora, 16. On September 22nd, they anchored with her at Port Louis. Seeing that the Boadicea was, so far as her Captain knew, the only British frigate on the station, and that, besides the Astree and Iphigenie, the French had the Venus and Manche in the immediate neighbourhood,. Rowley’s recapture of the Afriouine must be regarded as a very creditable exploit.

A few days earlier, the Ceylon, 32, Captain Charles Gordon, had been despatched from Madras to join Rowley. Looking in at Port Louis on September 17th, she saw what appeared to be a considerable French force in the harbour, and, bearing up, made all sail for Reunion. Commodore Hamelin, with the Venus and Victor, promptly put to sea in chase of her. The Ceylon descried her enemies at 2 A.M., and, at a few minutes past midnight, observing that the Venus was far ahead of her consort, shortened sail to begin action. Nominally a 32-gun frigate, she actually carried twenty-four long 18-prs., two long 9-prs., and fourteen 24-pr. carronades, or forty guns in all, while the Venus mounted twenty-eight long 8-prs., four long 8-prs., and twelve 36-pr. carronades, or forty-four guns in all, so that the broadside weight of metal of the British ship was only 343 lbs. against the Venus’s 484 lbs. Moreover, the Ceylon had on board but about 295 people, including 100 men of the 69th and 86th Regiments, and the Frenchman probably nearly her full complement of 380. In spite of the disparity of force, Gordon maintained a hot fight for an hour, at the expiration of which time the Venus dropped astern, and gave him an opportunity of repairing damages, and of endeavouring to escape, ere the Victor should get up. But at 12.15 A.M., the Venus again overtook him, and the battle was renewed, until both frigates became unmanageable. At 4.30 the Victor arrived, and, placing herself athwart the Ceylon’s bows, prepared to rake her, whereupon Gordon struck. At 5.10 his ship was taken possession of. She had lost 10 killed, and 31, including Gordon himself, and Master William Oliver, wounded. The losses of the Venus cannot be specified, but were no doubt severe. Had the Ceylon realised in time that the Victor, though a three-masted vessel of imposing appearance, was only a mere shell of a craft, less formidable than the ordinary 18-gun brig, she might have sunk her with a broadside, and, perhaps, have kept her flag flying for a few hours, when, as will be seen, she would have been relieved. At 7.30 A.M. on the 18th, Rowley, who was then at anchor in St. Paul’s Bay, saw the French ships and their prize at a distance of about nine miles from the shore. The Boadicea, reinforced with 50 volunteers from the Africaine [304], at once got under way with the Otter and Staunch, and made sail in chase. The Victor took the Ceylon in tow, and the three endeavoured to make the best of their way to Mauritius; but they were delayed, first by the tow-rope breaking [316], and then by the disproportion in size between the Ceylon and the Victor. At 3.30 P.M., therefore, the prize was cast off, the Venus lay by to protect her, and the Victor, in accordance with orders, stood away to the eastward. Scarcely was the corvette out of range ere the Ceylon rehoisted her colours, Lieutenant Philip Gibbon having temporarily taken command of her, in the absence of his seniors, who had been removed to the Venus. At 4.40 P.M. the Boadicea, ran alongside the Venus, and, in ten minutes, obliged her to strike, with a loss of 9 killed and 15 wounded. The Boadicea had only 2 wounded. Rowley then put back to St. Paul’s Bay. The Venus was a fine frigate of 1105 tons, and, to commemorate Willoughby’s splendid defence at Grand Port, she was added to the Navy as the Nereide.

The force on the Cape station, where Vice-Admiral Albemarle Bertie commanded, had received so many accessions of strength by the autumn of the year 1810, that it was determined to attempt the reduction of the island of Mauritius, then known as Isle de France. At Port Louis, the chief port of the colony, lay the frigates Bellone, Minerve, Manche, Astree, and Iphigenie, the corvette Victor, the brig Entreprenante, and another brig, besides several French merchantmen. After October 19th these were blockaded by the English frigates Boadicea, 38, Commodore Josias Rowley, Nisus, 38, Captain Philip Beaver, and Nereide, 38, Commander George Henderson (act. Captain).The entire expeditionary force was ordered to assemble off Rodriguez; but, a division from Cape Town not having arrived by November 21st, it was decided to start without it. On the following morning, therefore, the fleet set sail; yet, owing to adverse winds, it did not sight its destination until the evening of the 28th. A military force of about 10,000 men, under Major-General the Hon. John Abercromby, was embarked on board the ships, which numbered about seventy sail, and which ultimately included, besides transports, the vessels named in the note. On November 29th the whole fleet anchored in Grande Bale, about twelve miles to the north-east of Port Louis; and, the approaches having been most carefully sounded beforehand, the army, some Royal Marines, and a large body of seamen under Captain William Augustus Montage, who had relinquished command of the Cornwallis to take charge of the naval brigade ashore, were landed without opposition or casualty. The force advanced on the three following days, driving back the enemy, and suffering a loss of only 28 killed, 94 wounded, and 45 missing; and on December 2nd, realising that he could make no effective stand, the French general Decaen proposed terms. On the 3rd, in consequence, the island was formally surrendered. About 1300 regular troops laid down their arms, among them being nearly 500 Irish renegades. Decaen had also under his orders fully 10,000 militia; but they were insubordinate and disaffected, and he could not count upon them. In the batteries were 209 heavy guns, all in excellent condition; and in the harbour were the men-of-war already mentioned, the late British Indiamen Charlton, Ceylon, and United Kingdom, and twenty-four French merchantmen. The old Nereide which, after so gallant a defence under Nisbet Josiah Willoughby, had been taken on the previous 23rd of August, was also recovered, but she was in so battered a condition that she could not be restored to the Navy.

Courtesy of Peter Davis.
Image: Battle of Grand Port, Mauritius, 1810, artist unknown.